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CHAPTER I
THE SUBJECT OF THE THESIS
I THE SILVER PURCHASES
For over seven years it has been the policy of the
Federal Government to purchase vast quantities of silver for
addition to its monetary stocks. From 1933 through June of
1940, government acquisitions of silver amounted to more than
two and one third billions of fine ounces. The government has
purchased all the current domestic silver offered, at prices
averaging forty-one per cent above the market. This market
level has been unusually high, stimulated by the artificial
demand
.
Not all the silver acquired, however, was bought above
the market price. About four fifths of all the silver pur-
chased was foreign metal bought at approximately market prices.
This silver came from all over the world with largest portions
originating in Canada, China, India, and Mexico. A small
fraction of the silver, perhaps one twenty-second, was purchased
at 50.91 cents an ounce. This was the nationalized silver.
The money spent for the silver, more than one and a third
billion dollars, would liquidate Boston's 1936 debt ten times.
^
1 Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1938
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office,
1940)
, p.

2It would be enough to run the Government Printing Office at its
present cost for over 360 years. The Public Health Service
could continue on this amount for 130 years at its present
3
cost. The monetary value of this tremendous silver hoard,
arbitrarily set at |1.29 an ounce, is even greater, being about
2.4 times its cost value.
[
This thesis proposes to investigate the policy which has
'i
|| brought about this colossal store of the white metal. The
genesis of the silver movement, its basic premises, its
'Suppositions, and its actual results are to be examined in the
chapters that follow.
II THE SPECIAL INTEREST OF THIS SUBJECT
The cost of the silver program can hardly be expected to
excite wonder in this era when ten-place numbers are common-
place. There are, however, some unusual features connected with
i
the policy. For one thing, it has recieved more nearly
universal censure from financiers and economist than have most
other recent governmental projects. Also, it was apparently
forced upon an otherwise independent and powerful Adminis-
tration. Further, it is a rather unique p olitico-economic
development in that it furnishes illustrations of a wide
variety of the shortcomings of American democracy. A person,
learning of the United States only through its policies in
connection with silver, might well marvel at the Country's
2~rbid . , pp. 171,75.
3 Ibid., pp. 116.11.

3continued existence.
The present silver policy well exemplifies the manner
In which sound principles of economics are scrapped for the
popular, vote-getting fallacies. An examination of the topic
serves as a case-study of the manner in which the whole can be
weakened "by the determined efforts of a minority. At this
particular moment, when there is unusual consciousness of the
need for making the nation strong, more attention can well be
given to the advice of the economist. In the past decade,
despite the warnings sounded by nearly every economist of
repute in the country, the "silver debacle" was perpetrated.
It has added to the widespread monetary dislocations, and it
may well have further depreciated the position of silver in
the world.
Ill ORG-ANIZATION AND METHOD
The silver movement to be properly understood, needs to
be viewed within its proper context of history. It is not an
isolated phenomenon, but rather it is an occurrence entwined
in a multiplicity of monetary and economic developments.
Because of this the following three chapters, II, III, and IV,
consider the background and genesis of the movement and the
world position of silver.
In Chapter V are described the World Monetary And Econom-
ic Conference and the Legislative and Executive action of 1933.
4 See Ray B. Westerfield, Our Silver Debacle (New York:
The Ronald Press, 1936)
•

4Chapter VI gives the silver legislation of 1934 and in Chapter
' VII the actual manner in which the silver policy was executed
in 1934 and 1935 is discussed. Chapter VIII treats of the ef-
fects the United States silver purchases had on foreign countrieii.
In the dev^ elopment of the silver policy after 1936, the
weak character of its legislative opposition and the compromise
jof ^une-July, 1939 are of chief importance. Chapters IX and
X describe the events of these years. Finally, in Chapter XI an
attempt is made to evaluate the movement. Its claims and actual
l|results are more systematically treated in this final section
than elsewhere.
In the main, the presentation is historical. The baiis
©f the thesis rests on a study of New York Times and Congress ion-
al Record reports. As the bibliography and footnotes indicate,
diversified government documents and studies have also been used.
In the development of the thesis, statistical tEeatment is em-
ployed in so far as it is feasible. Tables and analysis charts
are included in the appendix.

ICHAPTER II
SILVER IN THE UNITED STATES
I BIHiETALLISM
The story of silver and American politics begins in
Colonial days. When specie was minted, it was silver. The Pine
Tree Shilling of Massachusetts is an example. Silver coinage
was well in keeping with colonial culture, for Spanish silver
money, especially the milled dollar or piastre , was the common
coin of that period.^ Likewise it was not a break with custom
when the Congress of the Confederation selected the silver
standard in 1786." nVhile the Confederation's silver dollar was
never coined, there "being no mint then, it does indicate the pop-
ular favor of the white metal.
In 1792, the majority of the statesmen, as well as the
masses, still wanted silver. Alexander Hamilton, however, had
a predilection for gold. In the spirit of compromise, the new
3Republic adopted bimetallism. Actually the will of the people
4prevailed, for their 15 to 1 ratio undervalued gold. As a
1 Simon L. Adler, Money And Money Units of the A merlean -
Colonies (Boston: P rivately printed, 1900), pp. 7-13*
2 Agnes F . Dodd , History Of Money In The British Empire
And The United States (New York: Longmans, Grreen, and Co., 1911)>
pp. 255-5^^
3 Anatol Murad, The Paradox of a Metal Standard (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Graphic Arts Press, Inc., 1939) » PP« 36-7.
4. Annual Report of the Director of the Mint . . . 1931
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office,
1931), p. 128.

6consequence silver monometallism was the de facto standard In
the United States up to 1834.
At this point the mint ratio was altered to just over
16 to 1.^ At this new ratio, thanks to happy circumstances, for
about nine years both gold and silver circulated. Then, after
this most unusual period, the commercial ratio of gold and silver
6
changed. G-old discoveries and silver loans to India tended to
enhance the white metal and Americans forthwith found it profit-
able to export their silver coins. When the small change short-
age became acute. Congress was forced to act on this, Just as
7
had P arliament years before.
II THE DE FACTO GOLD STANDARD
If silver coins w^re exported because of their excess
value, the practical thing to do was to reduce their fine con-
tent. Also, in order that the situation would not reverse it-
self with a resultant loss of gold, coinage would have to be
limited. The Act of 1853 did just this, debasing fractional
Q
currency by about 7 per cent. At 15 to 1 the silver would be
retained.^ No mention was made of the then-extinct silver dolla?
5 Slightly altered for standardization in 1837. Annual
Report of the Director of the Mint . . . 1901 » p. -^20.
6 Annual Report of the Director of the Mint . . . 1893 * 22
>
7 Murad, ov> cit . , pp. 32-5.
8 Annual Report of the Director of the Mint . . . 1901 ,
loc . cit .
9 Value of silver in terms of gold did not advance beyond
the ratio of 15.1 to gold, and in 1853 was at 15.33 to 1. Annual
Report of the Director of the Mint . . . 1931 » loc . cit.

7"because its loss did not occasion any great hardship,
j
So in actual practice bimetallism in the United States
had passed, and its passing was fue to the same matter-of-fact
necessity that had terminated it years earlier in England. The
remaining loophole, p otential unlimited coinage of the silver
dollar, was tacitly removed when routine monetary legislation in
1873 omitted it."^^
Bimetallism was brought to an end because it would not
function. Theoretical reasoning was lacking, however, so that the
real implications of its denouement were not generally realized.
This failure to comprehend the situation facilitated the silver
movement of the last quarter of the century.
Ill THE MOVEMENT FOR BIMETALLISM
After 1872 silver decreased in value for a variety of
reasons. L ed by the G-erman example, many countries demone-
12tlzed silver. Indian imports were low, and the production of
silver both in the United States and in the world as a whole
13 *Increased sharply. At the same time gold production decreased.
The result of this change in the relative values of the two
metals was that producers of silver, finding their revenues im-
^ lO^Director of the Mint . . . 1901 , loc. cit.
1 11 Annual Report of the Director of the Mint . . . 1893
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office,
I893i, p. 23.
I
12 See infra, pp.
13 During I87O-I88O alhver production increased in the
United States by I50 per cent; in the world, by 135 per cent.
Director of the Mint . . . 1901 , op. cit . , pp. 52-53.
V
8paired, would have been most happy to turn over their product
to the Mint at the old ratio of 16 to 1,
At the same time that silver interests were suffering,
1^ business in general was being afflicted by the long depression
of 1873. This furnished an ideal background for political oppor-
tunists. Cheap money was demanded for liquidating the debts
contracted during the preceding period of prosperity and high
prices. Sluggish circulation of money, a result of the depres-
ijsion, encouraged the popular idea that a dearth of money had brot e
brought on the economic break-down. Silver coinage at 16 to 1,
I 1C5
now that its commercial ratio was steadily declining, could
satisfy both the public's desire for cheap money and the silver
producers* demand for relief. Producers of the white metal
were not at all reticent in pointing this out.
II
By 1878 the silver coalition had mustered sufficient
strength to force the passage of a compromise measure, the Bland-
II 16
Allison Act. It directed the Secretary of the Treasury to
purchase silver bullion from time to time at its market price to
the extent of from two to four billion dollars worth each month.
As fast as purchased it was to be coined into standard silver
dollars of 412.5 grains, .900 fine. Holders of the dollars
14 During I87O-I88O gold production in the world decreased
by nearly 18 per cent. Loc . cit.
'I 15 Average annual ratios from I87I to 1879 » beginning witi]
1871, were: 15.57, 15.63, 15.93, 16.16, 16.64, 17-75, 17.20,
17.92, and 18.39. Director of the Mint . . . 1931 , loc . cit.
16 Director of the Mint . . . I90I
,
op. cit ., p. 420.
17 This is the ratio established in 1837 of 15.988 to 1.
Loc . cit.

10
Blight exchange them for certificates against which the Treasury
would preserve the coins. Full legal tender was established
for silver dollars, except in cases where contracts should stlp-
mlate to the contrary. Certificates, while not expressly
made legal tender, were to be "receivable for customs, taxes,
and all public dues ..."
The Act also provided for an international conference to
19
work for international bimetallism. While few people believed
the system could be used in one country alone, it had not yet
"been proved impracticable on an international basis. In fact,
some university men upheld the thesis that international bimetal-
lism would function with less fluctuations in values than would
monometallism.
Enacted through compromise, the Bland Allison Act pleased
neither the conservative elements nor the silver interests.
l|The patrons of the white metal grew stronger and were able to
secure the more favorable Sherman Act in 1890, which was essen-
20tially another compromise. Under its provisions 4,500,000
fine ounces of silver were to be purchased each month at a price
not in excess of a dollar for 371.25 grains. It was expressly
ordered that payment for the silver should be made in Treasury
notes redeemable on demand in coin. It did not specify whether
l5 statutes of the United States of America , 2nd Session,
45 th Congress (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Print-
ing Office, 1878), pp. 25,26.
19 Log. clt.
20 Dickson H. Leavens, Silver Money (Bloomington, Indiana:
Principia P ress. Inc., 1939) , p.4l."

11
the coin should he gold or silver.21 Until July 1st, 1891 > two
million ounces a month were to be coined into standard silver
dollars. After this date, coinage would he continued only as
redemption of the treasury notes might require."
Cleveland was elected president in 1892 and stepped into
the "endless chaint situation with its threats to completely
liquidate the gold reserve. Calling a special session of Con-
gress in 1893, he secured repeal of the Act.
Dissatisfaction on the part of the Populists and conserv-
atives continued. The presidential campaign of 1896 came to
be its focal point. While both platforms incorporated planks
favoring bimetallism, the more conservative Republicans condi-
tloned theirs on International acceptance of the standard."
Despite the colorful "cross of gold" and "crime of '73" catch
words, the election proved a decisive victory for McKlnley and
the sound money forces. With the defeat of Bryan passed the
first silver movement.
Under the two measures the country acquired a rather
large amount of silver. In the twelve years of the Bland-
Allison Act, purchases aggregated over 291 million fine ounces
25
at an average cost of $1,058 per fine ounce. The Sherman Act
2ir'statutes of the United States of America , 51st Congress
1st Session (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1890), pp. 289-90.
22 Loc. clt.
23 Leavens, 0£. clt., 60.
2A Murad, 0£. clt., p. 106.
25 See table VI, Appendix.
' r
12
increased the Inflow by over 168 million ounces to make an ag-
26gregate amount of 459 » 9^6, 700 .09 fine ounces.
' There was an international aspect of the silver movement
which should be noted in passing. Pursuant to the Bland-Allison
Act, the United States arranged for a world monetary conference
which was held in P aris in I878. All of the principal nations
27
attended except G-ermany, who evidently did not care to discuss
pQ
her silver dumping program. France was characteristically
conservative, and England, while she was anxious for stabilisa-
tion of her ratio with I ndia, was not at all disposed to do
29
anything herself.
A second and a third conference were held in 1881 at
Paris, and in 1892 at Brussels .^^ Both were opened in an opti-
mistic tenor, and both ended in utter failure
Silver could excite little genuine enthusiasm abroad as
its price continued to fluctuate widely and steadily sag.
Despite the magnitude of the American purchases, the value of
the white metal continued its downward course, begun in the earlj
20
•seventies. For instance, the average price of the Sherman
26 Loc. clt.
27 Francis A. Walker, International Bimetallism (New York:
Henry Holt And Company, I896)
, p. 191.
28 Director of the Mint . . . 1901, op, cit., p. 419.
29 Walker, loc. cit.
30 Ibid., pp. 194, 224.
31 Ibid., pp. 196, 229-30.
32 See Figure 1, Appendix.
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purchases amounted to only 92.44 cents an ounce. This declining
trend was to continue until the stimulus of the World War of
1914.
Between 1900 and the War there was a lapse in the efforts
of the silver enthusiasts. P rices of silver were tolerable,
"5 "5
fluctuating "between sixtey-seven and fifty-two cents. -^-^ Also,
the cojapanion metals, copper, lead, and zinc, were bringing
3
35
•74
good prices.-^ In fact, prices in general had risen steadily
after 1895
•
IV SILVER IN THE WORLD WAR
The production of gold between I896 and I9IO had increasea
36
t)y 135 per cent while that of silver advanced a scant 41 per oentff
The ratio of production was therefore favorable to silver in
terms of gold and at the same time the more than doubled annual
Increments of the yellow metal were an Important cause in the
higher level of prices. Even with the World War, the silveg
output did not surge ahead, as did the production of most other
etals. Mexican unrest-^'^ and the fact that costs at first rose
faster than the silver prices were the chief reasons for the
absence of marked accelerations in the metal' s output.
33 Loc . cit .
34 Statistical A bstract , op . cit . , p. 705.
35 Ibid ., p. 314.
36 Ibid., p. 728.
37 Westerfield, og. clt«» P« 14.

14
It la evident thcit times were not at all unfavorable for
sliver. Favorable Indian balances of trade and Chinese prosper-
Ity resulted In heavy Far Eastern imports of the metal. At
the same time industlal consumption in the United States in-
•50
creased greatly. ^ The use of silver coins by the huge armies
40In the field required greater coinage of silver. The net
result of these factors was abnormally high silver prices after
1915* With these high prices* strangely enough, came an out-
right subsidy to United States silver interests.
The high price of silver caused a run on the Indian
41Treasury for the conversion of rupee notes into silver. The
British Indian Government raised the exchange ratio of the
rupee, but the situation could not be sufficiently corrected to
completely halt the treasury drain. The United Statesheld suf-
ficient silver in its monetary stocks to replenish the Indian
reserves. Furthermore, the silver holdings /here were idle and
useless. Selling them to England for Indian shipment would
fiirnish an admirable method of liquidating them.
To this end, the "Plttman Act" of April, I9I8 was passed.
Under section one, the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized
38 Handy & Harmon, Annual Review of the Silver Market for
1922 (New York: privately printed. 1923). td. 3. Murad. otd. cit..
pp. 111-12.
39 Director of the Mint . . . 1931. op. cit., p. 40.
40 Mura d, loc. cit.
41 Ibid., pp. 113-14.
42 As is emphasized in Leavens, Senator P Ittman was not
the author of this bill which bears his name. Leavens, op. cit.,
D. 146.
>

15
to melt up and sell as bullion up to 350 million silver dollars.
Section tv/o, however, required that all silver dollars melted
be subsequently replaced by similar dollars minted from United
States silver. In addition, it specified that this silver shouldl
43be bought at the price of one dollar a fine ounce. According
to a speech by Senator Fittman, this part of the Act had to be
44
j|railroaded through Congress. Thus the government was hood-
winked into subsidizing the white metal at the high point of its
prosperity.
There were available in the Treasury on June 30, 1918
nearly 422 million silver dollars in addition to over fourteen
4s
million ounces of silver bullion. While the Act permitted
Imeltlng 350 million of the dollars, only $259,121,554 were
actually melted. From this operation, 200,032,325.64 ounces of
46
silver were obtained for sale to the British.
Some attempts were made to repeal the purchase clause.
jThe most serious opposition came toward the end of 1919 from
Representative McFadden. He advocated not only striking out the
purchase clause, but he also desired a reduction in the fineness
47
©f subsidiary silver coins
.
43 Statutes of tte United States of America , 65th Congress
2nd Session, 1918 (Washington, D.C.: United States G-overnment
Printing Office, 1918), pp. 535-36.
I 44 Westerfield, 0£. cit., pp. 21-22.
I
45 Director of the Mint . . . I9I8 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1918), p. 143.
46 The melting was carried on during the period, April 2^
1918 to May 10, 1919. Figures appear: Director of the Mint .
• • 1919 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1919) , p. 120.
f
16
The A ct remained as passed, however, and the Treasury
Department began its purchases in May of 1920. The price of
silver at that time dropped to below a dollar and it continued
to drop. The purchases were continued for Qbout three years
49
when the mint announced their conclusion in March of 1923*
Silver producers expected an immediate drop in the price of the
that
metal. To avert this they advocated/a loan of 200 million
ounces of the metal be made to China. Nothing came of the pro-
posal and, to the surprise of almost everybody concerned,
silver prices did not slump. Because of the special price
arrangement of a dollar an ounce, the silver-mine owners obtained
a bonus of about $58*169,950 more than the amount comparable
sales would have brought on the open market.
47 Engineering And Mining Journal. 109:4, Jan. 24, 1920.
48 Director of the Mint . . . 1920 (Washington, D.C.:
United States P rinting Office, 1920), p. 8.
49 Handy and Harmon, Annual Review of the Silver Market
for 1^2J> (New York: privately printed, 1924), p. 3.
50 Ibid., p. 4.
51 Westerfield, 02» cit. , p. 18«

CHAPTER III
THE WORLD-POSITION OF SILVER
Due to the scarcity of gold prior to the Spanish pillag-
ing of the New World, silver was for a long time the principal
and popular form of currency. After the influx of gold, both
metals circulated. Becasue of coinage, it was necessary to
establish mint ratios between the two media. These ratios
often differed from country to country and were also usually
at variance with the prevailing commercial ratio. Asa result,
only rarely did both metals circulate simultaneously in the
same country. In addition, these attempts to preserve two stan-
dards led to chronic mutilation of the coinage. Well-informed
people were sort of boot-leg mints, ready to clip or sweat away
the amount of metal by which the coin was undervalued.^
I THE PASSIVE DEMONETIZATION OF SILVER
It so happened that after 1696 England undervalued her
silver coinage. As a consequence, she lost it. Only gold and
the few mutilated silver coins remained. After a time the gold,
through custoH), came to replace silver in the minds of the people
as the popular money. When treatened with loss of the yellow
metal in favor of light-weight silver coins, England acted to
1 Murad, og. cit . . pp. 1-29. Also, Shaw, The History Of
Currency (L ondon: Clement Wilson, I896)
, pp. 219-32.
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retain it. Deviating from the customary practice of trying a
new mint ratio, she first limited the legal tender power of
2
silver In 1774 , and then temporarily suspended Its coinage In
3 4
1798. Finally, In 1816, to keep the white metal from being
sold to the higher bidders abroad, she debased Its coinage.
The rise In the value of silver In terms of gold, an event
quite beyond the nation's control, had forced her to reduce the
I
silver currency to token money In order to retain It.
Gold thus came to be the standard money In England
through a series of accidents beginning with the Incorrect ratio
of 1696. Quite by chance, this occurred In the country which
came to dominate world commerce In the nineteenth century.
These accidental and coincidental circumstances constitute the
primary cause of silver's present Insignificant monetary r^e.
II THE A CTIVE DEMONETIZATION OF SILVER
In 1871 G-erman commercial interests were able to induce
their country to facilitate their commerce by adopting the
standard of the world's foremost trader.^ This demonetization
of silver encouraged others. Sales of the demonetized metal de-
pressed the value of silver and caused sever market fluctua-
tions. On account of this, the Latin Monetary Union was virtual-
ly forced into suspension of silver currency in 1874. The
' 2 Murad, o^* cit . , p. 31.
3 Ibid., p. 32.
4 Ibid
. , pp 31-4.
5 Director of the Mint . . . 1893 « op . cit., p. 22.

19
Scandinavian countries adopted gold in 1873.'^ Austria-Hungary,
Russia, and Japan were among the countries choosing the gold
standard In the last decade of the centjiry. By 1900, all com-
mercially Important countries together with most of their satel-
Q
lltes were on the full gold standard or a related arrangement.
At this period, around the turn of the century, Chile,
Gosta Rica, Peru, the Dominican Republic, P anama, Mexico, El
Salvador, Venezuela, and Brazil all established themselves on
Q
some sort of a gold arrangement. Argentina and Uruguay had
already adopted gold in 1875 and 1876 ."^^ The colonial posses-
sions, India, the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-Chlna, and the
Philippines were on gold exchange standards.^"''
Ill RECENT STATUS OF SILVER
So universal was the trend to gold that by 1933 only
four countries in the entire world were on even a slightly
12
modified silver standard. Hong Kong was on a technically
perfect silver standard. China had only a few restrictions on
6 Ibid., pp. 21-23. and Director of the Mint . . . 1901,
op. clt., p. 420.
7 Loc. clt.
8 Loc. clt.
9 Loc. clt.
10 Loc. clt.
11 Loc. clt.
12 Herbert M. Bratter, The Monetary Use Of Silver In 1933
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government P rlntlng Office,
1933), p. 1.
I
20
the movement of silver. Macao and Tibet could also be classed
ll
as on that 3tand,ard."^^ Of these four nations, only China has
been of commercial importnace. Her gross commerce amounted to
.only 2 or 3 per cent of tte world's total international trade
: during the last few years.
I It is true that silver has been widely used as subsidiary
I
coinage. In times of low silver prices there is a trend toward
Imore extensive use of the metal, while high prices encourage
'i
lithe substitution of cheap er metals and, where practical, paper.
iSo, after 1926, there was clearly the beginnings of a return to
! 15
silver as subsidiary coinage. Perhaps the people of the world
had not become sufficiently accustomed to the cheaper media of
I
the early 'tv/enties. Also, at the same time that substitutes
for silver were being employed, nany currencies were simultane-
' ously being ruined through inflation. An association between
the two occurrences might well have been formed in the popular
imind. However, the nascent return to silver was quickly ended
by high silver prices in the * thirties.
In general, we may say that demonetixation has prevailed
since the World War of 1914.-^^ Mr. Bratter lists thirty-three
13 Loc . clt.
14 See table XI, Appendix.
15 Bratter, op. cit., pp. 57, 61, 80-81.
16 From 1919 to 1929, the proportion of silver to gold
in the central bank reserves of the world declined by 41 per
cent. Y.S. L eong. Silver (Washington, D. C: The Brookings
Institution, 1934), p. 146. Calculations from data furnished
in this reference.
4
21
countries which reduced the fine content of their silver coinage
17
"between 1919 and 1933. Canada, Prance, Germany, Italy, Japan,
T8
and the United Kingdom, are included in the list. BelgiiAm,
Denmark, and Turkey, with all their colonies, and Finland,
Norway, and France discontinued the use of silver altogether for
19
at least a period of years . From 1920 to 1933 over 5^1
20
million fine ounces of demonetized silver entered the market.
21
Over 155 million ounces of this came from British India.
IV EFFECTS OF THE DEMONETIZATION
These sales had a double effect on the market. They
greatly increased the supply of the white metal while at the
same time they marked a curtailment of its potential demand.
The ensuing lack of silver as a circulating medium would do a
great deal to "break the custom upon which rested the metal's
monetary demand.
Under prevailing conditions of the past, however, this
would have had only a slight effect on the market. Throughout
the nineteenth century and as late as the third decade of this
century, the Far Eastern demand had always been recognized as
the permanent, long-run causative factor in the price of
pp
silver. The correlation of this factor and the price of the
17 Bratter, o^. cit., p. 6.
18 Loc . cit.
19 Loc . cit.
20 Loc. cit. Also, see table X, Appendix.
21 Loc. cit.
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white metal is evident as Figure 1 In the Appendix Illustrates.
This, In light of the fact that Indian purchases are very de-
li
I
pendent upon the nonsoon and resultant degree of agricultural
^ |i prosperity, might he valid proof. (The development of the
monsoon would hardly be dependent upon the price of silver.)
However, be that as it may, it is of greater importance
i here to note what the price has been. I t is seen by referring
i:
I
to Figure 1 that the price fluctuated around sixty-five cents
an ounce from 1921 through 1926. Many people came to feel that
the price was permanently stabilized at that figure. In
ji
1927 > though, it became all too apparent that the price had
I
started on more than a temporary decline in the preceding year.
I
Sales of India's demonetized silver were generally believed to
I
j be the principal cause of the slump. The populace of India
I
were still absorbing the white metal, however, and China, in
24
spite of the dislocations of warfare, bought heavily at times.
Once the break in the market did occur, the situation
was aggravated by the continued heavy production of silver by
United States mines. In this country silver is normally pro-
duced as a by-product of the mining of copper, of lead, and, to i
a lesser extent, of zinc. Between 1925 and 1930 about 80 per
cent of our silver production was derived in such a manner.
22 This ovservation is based upon reading many government
documents and the Annual Reviews of Handy and Harmon.
23 Handy & Harmon, Annual Review of the Silver Market
for 1926 (New York: privately printed, 1927) p. 6.
24 Handy and Harmon's Reviews for years 1926-30. Also,
Director of the Mint . . . 1931 » op . cit., p. 115.
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Because of this, in 1926 and the three following years, the
I
United States output of the white metal aggregated around 243
million fine ounces. This Is over 93 per cent of the amount
^ produced during the preceding period of four years when sliver
Iprlces were In the neighborhood of sixty- five cents.
The fact that so much of our sliver production Is aecond-
I
ary to the production of other metals also explains why Its
I
producers raised no hue and cry before the depression. Up to
the crash, the major metals, copper, lead, and zinc, were
'!
Ibrining such favorable returns that silver revenues were only so
much added profit. However, after 1929 conditions were altered.
|
I
Then Handy and Harmon, along with other experts, sought to
|ishow that silver's plight was no worse than that of certain
26
other commodities, real estate, for example. Despite this, the
anguished cries of the silver Interests resounded In the
halls of Congress to the end that "something be done for silver ."i
25 L eong, o^. clt • , p. 75.
26 Handy & Harmon, Annual Review of the Silver Market for
1932 (New York: privately printed, 1932), p. 6.
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CHAPTER IV
THE PRESSURE FOR SILVER LEGISLATION
I CHIEF SOURCES OF THE PRESSURE
While pressure to do something for silver was not limited
to the United States, the subsidization of the metal received
special attention in this country. One of the reasons, the
most obvious, is found in the combination of regional represen-
tation in Congress, particularly in the Senate, and of the
geographical concentration of silver mines. Eight western
states, as Figure 4 shows, are the silver states • This means
that twelve to sixteen senators, hopeful of re-election, are
going to combine for silver regardless of personalities and
party lines. Thanks to pork-barrel legislation and log-rolling,
these senators are in a position to achieve a great deal more
than either their number of the importance of silver to our
economy would seem to warrant."^
In the House, where representation is based upon popula-
tion, it is evident that the silver staes could hope to accom-
plish but little. Actually Californian congressmen have not
been of noticeable significance to the white-metal cause. Con-
sequently, in the lower body there are only about a dozen out-
and-out silver enthusia^s. Of course, as will be developed, the
silver men were aided by certain inflationists.
Another reason leading to the pressure in this country
m
24
Is the concentration of ownership of world silver production In
American interests. As table VIII illustrates, over 60 per
cent of the world's silver production in 1929 was controlled by
United States capital. This situation, when combined with our
highly-developed lobbying system, suggests the source of a
major part of the drive behind the silver movement.
II THE SUGGESTED LOAN TO CHINA
In 1930, demands to "do something for silver" began to be
heard in increasing volume and tempo. During the latter part of
the year the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations announced
that it was considering a plan for loaning silver to China. At
that time it was advocated as a means of reestablishing peace
A
in the Orient.
At about the same time, October, the press carried account
of Mr. P. M. W. Linebarger's plans for securing such a loan
here.^ He was described as an American financial advisor to the
Nanking Government. When he arrived, however, both his claim
1 United States production of silver in value during
1925-29 amounted to only .6 of 1 per cent of the value of all
metals produced in the United States during that period. Leong,
op . clt
. , p. 97. Also, silver amounted to only .1 of 1 per cent
of the v§.lue of all commodities exchanged in 1926. Leong, op .
clt., pp. 94-5.
2 This is probably due to the relative insignificance of
silver ^0 the diversified economy of the State. Probably no
large group of voters feel that the metal is of much importance
to their welfare
.
3 Leong, o^. clt . , pp. 68-71.
4 New York Times, Oct., 9, 1930.
5 Ibid.. Oct. 17. 1930
.
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for Chilians desire for such a loan and his personal authority
were denied by Finance Minister Soong.
The idea of a silver loan was revived in the early part
^ of 1931. In February the Foreign Relations Committe considered
I
the formation of an international silver pool for extending
from 200 to 300 million ounces of silver to China.' This was
^'to be withdrawn from the 495 million ounces held in the United
States Treasury. According to the plan, American producers
would be called upon to replace the aaount withdrawn.
' Indications were lacking that China was eager for a
loan and there was no valid reason for supposing that she would
prefer the loan to be made in silver. If it were for foreign
purchases, then gold v/ould be the necessary medium of purchase.
However, the silver interests evidently were bent on disposing
of some of their excess product through that outlet, and in May
of 1931* Senator Pittman went to China for an investigation.^
Perhaps he hoped to show the Chinese their dire need for the
loan*
III SILVER, THE CAUSE OF THE DEPRESSION
1
In 1930, inflation of the currency was neither popular
nor widely approved. However, it evidently was felt by the
silver enthusiasts that the best way to get something done for
1^
5~Ibid., Oct. 31, 1930.
7 Ibid ., Feb., 21, 1931.
8 Log. cit.
9 Ibid .. April 26, May 30, 1931.
•
r l~,
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the metal would be to publicize its ills as being the cause of
the depression.
Senator Pittman fired the opening gun on this matter in
a statement issued in November of 1930.'^^ He drew several
questionable conclusions from a series of incorrect propositions
For example:
Nine-tenths of the princip al governments of the world,
including India and China, and containing one half of the popu-
lation, have substantially no money except silver. -^^
The statement is obviously in error. India should not
have been included for she had a great deal of non-silver
12
money, and paper was steadily replacing the specie. At that
time, India was trying to get rid of a good part of her excess
silver. In as much as he denounced the Indian sales at another
point, the Senator must have been aware of this fact.
The statement was more true in regard to China, who was
then on the silver standard. However, the implication that
low-priced silver was hurting the Chinese was in error as is
indicated in section one of chapter VIII, below, and by table
XI of the Appendix. Also, as the Senator could have learned
from any number of Government publications, China's population
of some 466.8 millions is only about one fifth of the world's
10 Ibid . , Nov. 25, 1930.
11 Loc. cit .
12 Bratter, op. cit., p. 40.
13 Annual Report of the Director of the Mint for • • •
1940 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1940)
, p. 95 • The Commerce Yearbook for 1930 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1930), p. 13
cites the population as high as 482.8 millions.

27
total. •'•5 It hardly seems reasonable that the Senator Included
Tibet, Macao, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia in the "principal gov-
ernments of the world."
He spoke about the great loss in world trade because of
the drop in the value of the Chinese standard metal. Yet be-
tween 1926 and 1930, Chinese imports amounted to less than 3.4
14per cent of the total for the world. However, if his thesis
could Just be repeated often enough, it might gain public
acceptance.
The depression idea was supported by Francis H. Brownell,
Chairman of the Board of the American Smelting and Refin|?ig
Company • He stood with those advocating international co-
15
operation. His suggestion was that the governments of the
United States; England, including India; and France, including
'I
Indo-China, should set some price at which they would stabilize
silver. Fifty cents a fine ounce was the price he mentioned
by way of an example. Until the price reached this figure and
whenever it might later fall below it, the countries would pur-
chase as heavily as their laws would permit. Whenever the price
i
went up to fifty-five cents, then such selling nations as India
16
might dispose of limited quantities. In the light of
experience, it is evident that such an agreement could not have
been achieved.
I
14 Statistical Abstract . . . 1938 * op . cit . , pp. 460,64.
15 New York Times, Jan. 19, 1931.
16 Loc. cit.
0-
28
IV BRITISH SUPPORT
I
Among the Englishmen who gave credence to the spposedly
causal connection of silver to the depression was J. F.
Darling. Mr. Darling had recently retired from an eleven-
years ' career in Indian banking and was at this time a director
of the Midland Bank of London. In a speech in eatly 1931 he
exhorted the world to give back to silver its "rightful time-
I
honored position." He pointed out how the evil decline of the
metal was permitting China to become a producing competit or in
the world's markets. It is interesting to note that while
Senator Pittman was asking for high-priced silver for the good
of China, Mr. Darling was asking for it for Just the opposite
effect.
Mr. Darling's plan for the rehabilitation of silver in-
cluded the creation of a super-bank to administer the United
Kingdon's gold and silver reserves. Here he prescribed a new
money of account, the "rex," to awaken and unify the Empire.
The new system would be bimetallic with one "rex" equal to 113
grains of silver. He hinted that this 20 to 1 bimetallism
would bring Prance and the United States into the British
orbit.
Two others deserve special mention in connection with
this p hase of the movement for the relief of silver. Colonel
F. L. Harding, former editor of the China Press, continually
IQdeplored the demonetization of silver.^ J. B. Thomas, an owner
TFlbid., Jan. 28, 1931.
18 Loo, cit.
i
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of Important British coal mines, pointed to the low price of
silver as the ruin of the British and American cotton indus-
tries. So long as China manufactured textiles for her own
consumption and for that of her neighbors, the Lancashire mills
lost a substantial part of their market. Because of this, the
English mills reduced their American cotton imports.
V PETITIONS FOR A CONFERENCE
Notwithstanding the usual failure of such international
gatherings, the silver enthusiasts kept aski ng for a world
conference. Usually they included monetary matters in general,
probably as a bid for wider support. The requests came from
the silverites, however, and silver received the emphasis.
In February of 1931 a subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations petitioned President Hoover to call
21
one. Two months later. Senator Pittman, in a statement to
pp
the press, purported to show the need for such a parley. In
June the silver-state senators Joined with producers in peti-
p"5
tioning P resident Hoover to call the conference."^ They
scoffed at the value of informal discussions which the Admin-
istration had previously suggested. In this manner first one,
then another, carried on the barrage. Senator Pittman was
particularly dogged in his attempts. He constantly shifted the
) 20Tbid . , January 28, 1931.
21 Ibid., February 12, March 3, April 4, 1931.
22 Ibid ., April 26, 1931.
23 Ibid . , June 1, June 24, 1931
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blame from Britain to the United States for the failure to call
the conclave
In England, J. F. Darling, among others, demanded a con-
ference. Mexico, the largest producer of the white metal
and the country most dependent upon it for private and public
^6
revenue, also wanted an international parley.
VI THE OPPOSITION
Even among the friends of silver, however, the desire
for a convention was not unanimous. Sir J. A. Salter in G-reat
Britain, like many other Englishmen, realized the first need
was to work for the rehabilitation of business in general.
In this country the silver brokers, Handy and Harmon, were not
in favor of special aid to silver because of their fear of the
long-run effect of creating artificial conditions for the com-
28
modity. The majority of London bankers were opposed for
OQ
comparable reasons. ""^ The National City Bank and the Bank of
"50
America similarly opposed the proposal.'
24 Ibid., Dec. 4, and 11, 1931, for example.
25 Ibid., June 9, 1931.
26 Ibid., June 1, 1931.
27 Ibid., June 2, 1931.
28 Ibid., Jan. ,3, 1932.
29 Ibid., June 2, 1931 and Jan., 4, 1932.
30 Ibid., May 4, 1931.
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VII INDIAN SILVER SALES
A majority of petitioners in this country hoped to use
the conference mainly as a means of halting the Indian silver
sales. These sales, which were a factor in silver's low price,
31
received a great deal of condemnation here. Enough attention
was called to them, in fact, to warrant a rather spirited re-
joinder from Sir George Schuster, Finance Member of the Indian
Government. In his budget speech of February 28, 1931, he
pointed out that American producers were eager to curtail Indian
sales while their own output should remain unrestricted. He
suggested that the Americans were ungrateful for the past
magnitude of the Indian absorption of their metal.
VIII THE WAR-DEBT PROPOSAL
Another popular silver proposal was that debtor govern-
ments be permitted to pay their war debts in the metal. Four
33
of our larger producers suggested it in June, 1931. Senator
Hayden offered a bill in May, 1932, for accepting payment in
silver at a dollar an ounce if the nation so paying would agree
34
to restore its silver coinage to .900 fine. If this stipula-
tion should not be met, settlement would be permitted at the
31 This becomes apparent In the general reading of pro-
silver speeches and literature of the earlier "thirties.
32 Bratter, oq. cit., p. 30.
33 New York Times, June 24, 1931.
34 Ibid., May 2, 1932.
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rate of one and a half ounces per dollar, providing payment
would be accompanied by a promise to debase silver no further.
Representative Somers presented a parallel measure in the
35House. Later Senator Hayden advocated the payment plans in a
radio address over the NBC network.
IX THE SOMERS AND PITTMAN BILLS
Of the many bills offered for doing something for silver,
the Somers and Pittman proposals are most important. While
neither were passed, they should be noted as manifestations of
the specific hopes of the silver bloc.
The Somers Bill was reported favorably by the House
37Committee on Coinage, Weights, and Measures.^' It directed
the Treasury to accept up to |250,000,000 worth of silver bullior
beginning at the time of passage of the measure. It would have
established a monthly limit of forty million fine ounces.
Superimposed upon this absolute minimum was an intricate series
of price limitations. Prices were not to exceed forty cents
per fine ounce during the first three months after passage, nor
fifty cents and sixty cents per fine ounce, respectively,
during the second and third periods. Thereafter, if the price
had reached the sixty cents specified, it might be advanced by
a half a cent a month until it reached seventy-five cents.
35 Ibid., May 6, 1932.
36 Ibid., Dec, 27, 1932.
37 House of Representatives, Report No. 2186, Silver
'Bullion. (Washington. D.C.I United States aovftrntnfint. Printing
Office, 1933)
1
i
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1
Thus If the full isisount w©r© purehaeed each month at the naxl*
mum price perralttod, the purehasas would extend over almost a
year. There were a few other specifications as from what souroe
the bullion might come. Thea© were designed to prevent hold**
up3 • and further demonetization,
Mr# Comers* optimism is evident in his provision which
peraits the sale of bullion when deemed necessary to preserve
the stabllluy of the prloe* The power to coin sliver dollars
from the acquisitions Is purely discretionary with the Treasury
Department.
The report did not end with the r^resentation of the
bill* The views of Kr. Felsinger were included to explain that
althou^'h the bill v/as reported favorably, the majority favored
an alternative loroposal. By way of Introduction to thi3> iir.
Feisinger stated that the Committe© was forced to believe it
had found tho baoic cauoo of the dpresalon* As to what cause
was ©stabllshodft he was anything b^^t oleaiu however f, this bill
**whlch puts the United States 'Joverninont > for the first time In
history • in control of Ite economic welfai^e'' \?a3 Uiq remedy .-^
Under the bill, the Secretary of the Treasury was to buy
150 sillion cunoeo of silver within four months and an addition*
si 250 million ounces vfithln twelve aonths of the act's passage*
Th© acquisitions were to continue until a price of tl»^9 per
ounce w&s attained and stabilized. There were very comr5licat8dl
limitations iWernin^ the quantities to bo acquired and the pric
38 m 14784 included In ibid.
e
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1
to b« paid* To start the program * f 130*000,000 waa to t>e
appropriated* As Dllver waa acquired » certli'lcatGS wero to be
Issued againc-t it to cover subsequent puroiiases, Ilotwlthetand*
iRg the confidence of tiie Committee* neither bill becaffie law. ,
Another very much publicized achetne which aliailarly
failed to open the treasury vaultis to silver ^ was Uie Pittaan
39
Bill {3. 3C0C) * The fact that this plan called for the
ennual nui'chaBe of only 60 million fine ounces, approximately
oae eigiith of tho Sociers Bill maximum and juot over one seventh
of the Feisinger limits suggest that the Senator thoushb it
might be enacted* The silver was to be paid for through the
leauG of certificates. Limitations were simple current domoa*
tio silver wao to be nuj'chased not in oxoess of five million
9mM99 per month, at the market price, providlns It should not
be more than ten cents im ounce above the average price for the
preceding tta^ee aontiio*
It became apTjarent that nothlnr for silver could bo
accomrjllshed under the outgoing administrati on. This v/as re-
fleeted In the price of the white metal which ntlll continued to
fluctup.te about low levelo^ and in DeoeEber it rer^lBtered its
lowest monthly avora(?;c. At that time it was only twenty-five
cents a fine ounce.
39 Senate Ropofct* No. 843« Purchase Of fUlver Produoed
In The United orates .ith Sllve?:' Certificates. { .ianhln.^^ton. P.C.
United States Govex'nment ? rlntinr" Office, 1932)
i
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among other things, the revaluation of both the gold and silver
dollars. A 50 per cent devaluation limit was prescribed for
the gold dollar, but for the silver, there was none. The
section also allowed bimetallism (the unlimited coinage of gold
and silver) at any ratio deemed advisable.^
Section forty-five of the Act authorized the acceptance
of silver bullion in payment of foreign debts due the United
States. Such silver might be accepted within six months of the
Act's passage at a price of not more than fifty cents an ounce
and up to an aggregate amount not in excess of $200,000,000.
Against the silver so acquired, the Secretary of the Treasury
was directed to Issue silver certificates to the amount of
debt the acquisitions liquidated. The Act further stipulated
that these certificates might never by retired.
Under Section forty-five of the Act the United States
received |ll ,367 ,412 .18 worth of silver valued at the acceptance
rate of fifty cents an ounce. This, it is noted, was only
about one seventeenth of the maximum quantity authorized.
Arranged in decreasing order by the size of payment the countrle i
paying in silver were Great Britain, Italy, Czechoslovakia,
Finland, Riimanla, and Lithuania, with Great Britain paying
over ten million dollars worth of the total.
There has been but little mention made of the certifi-
cates clause and apparently the Treasury issued only $1,560,000
2 Ibid . , p. 53.
3 See table IX, Appendix
(
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in silver certificates against this sliver. This was done In
February, 1934 when 3,120,000 fine ounces were placed In the
4
certificate reserve.
II THE WORLD CONFERENCE
In the meantime p reparations had been in progress for
the London Financial and Economic Conference which was to open
[discussions on June 12, 1933« In preparation for the Confer-
ence, a series of pre-conferences were held in Washington. In
the course of these it became evident that while France and
Germany would not actively oppose a small subsidy to silver, they
4
were very definitely for a return to the gold standard. On
May 16, 1933 announcement was made of a meeting on silver
attended by Canadian, Mexican, and United States experts.^
After Canada dropped out of further discussions, Mexico and the
United States continued. On the els;hteenth, President
7
Roosevelt and Mr. Pani of Mexico Issued their joint statement.
Senator Plttman "clarified" it by stating that both countries
were in favor of higher silver prices, stabilization of the
prices with gold, and a greater use of the metal in central
bank reserves. The Joint statement had merely said in regard
to silver that a "project of agreement" for stabilization of its
~ 4 United States Treasury Daily Statement
,
February 28,
1934.
5 New York Times, May 12, 1933.
6 Ibid . , May 16, 1933.
7 Ibid., May 19, 1933.
i{
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Drice had been discussed,
Chinese Finance Minister Soong Joined with the President
in saying that the price of silver "should be enhanced and
stabilized, "9 but in the light of the prevailing conditions in
China it was evident that he did not mean for the price to be
enhanced very greatly. The Japanese delegate, Ishii, was more
careful. In his Joint statement the "enhanced" was modified by
"reasonably. "10
On the day of the Chinese-American statement Senator
Pittman announcedthat all nations consulted had agreed that
(1) silver prices should be "reasonably raised and stabilized;*'
(2) the debasing and melting of silver coins should cease; (3)
coins already debased should be restored in fineness as soon
as practicable; and, (4), existing obstructions to the metal's
11
free movement should be eliminated or lowered.
A resolution giving explicit instructions for the silver
question to the country's delegates was tabled on the advice
12
of Economic Adviser Feis. The Wheeler resolution, however,
which urged the United States delegates to work for the remon-
13
etization of silver was adopted by the Senate on May eighth.
8 Loc. cit.
9 Loc. cit.
10 Ibid., May 28, 1933.
11 Ibid., May 20, 1933.
12 Ibid., May 18, 1933.
13 Ibid., May 9, 1933.
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III THE CONFERENCE
The conference opened imder a cloud. President Roose-
velt's monetary policies had irked other nations, particularly
14
France. However, our delegates with their host of advisers
plowed along as best they could under the circumstances.
Senator Pittman, one of the six delegates, worked our some minor
15gold proposals. Aided by his personal assistant Edward
16
Bruce, San Franciscan lawyer and silver expert, he strove
mainly for silver resolutions.
On June nineteenth he offered a plan for building up
the silver content of Central Bank reserves to 20 per cent of
their total. ' Sir G-eorge Schuster pledged India's support
IQ
to various Pittman silver proposals, ^ and Canada agreed to co-
20
operate. The Chinese expressed concern lest the price of
silver be raised too much. In fact, they seemed to prefer to
21leave it at its present level.
The conference had achieved harmony and progress was
being made on both the gold and silver proposals when President
Roosevelt exploded his famous message of July third on the gold
resolution. He chided the conferees for their "artificial and
14 Ibid., May 30, 1933.
15 Ibid., May 30, June 28, 29, 1933. '
16 Ibid., May 31, 1933.
17 Ibid., June 20, 1933.
18 See supra, p. 31.
19 New York Times, June 27, 1933.
i
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temporary" plan, and he said that
"The United States seeks the king of dollar which a generation
hence will have the same purchasing power and debt paying power
as the dollar we hope to attain in the near future. 20
The criticism came as a great surprise even to the United
i States delegation. The reaction of foreign delegations was
' first one of anger, then resignation. Yet, under these condi-
i
tions the conference continued, and while very little was
I
accomplished, something was done for silver. On July twentieth
I'
a subcommittee unanimously approved a general resolution on
I
silver later adopted by the Conference at its final plenary
23
session on the twenty-seventh.
IV THE EIGHT NATION SILVER PACT
The general resolution to restore silver as subsidiary
coinage in so far as p ossible and to refrain from further de-
basement of the coinage was eventually signed by sixty-six
nations." It carried a special sub-agreement , the Eight-
Nation Silver Pact." the pact was entered into by India, China,
and Spain as holders of large reserves of silver, and by
Australia, Canada, the United States, Mexico, and Peru as
25
principal producers of the metal.
20 Ibid., June 28, 1933.
21 Loo , clt.
22 Ibid ., July 4, 1933.
23 Leavens, o^. clt . , p. 249.
24 New York Times , July 27, 1933.
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Under its provisions India agreed not to dispose of more
than 140 million fine ounces of silver during the four year
period beginning January 1, 1934. Besides this amount, she
could transfer additional stocks for payment of war debts to the
United States. Her aggregate disposals for the four years,
however, were not to be over 175 million ounces a year,
balances to be cumulative. A limit of fifty million ounces in
any one year was also established.
China agreed to sell no silver from demonetized coins
during the four years. The Country signed the agreement with
an added reservation. If changes in the relative values of
gold and silver adversely affected the Chinese people, contrary
to the spirit of the agreement, then the National Government
would act as it should deem appropriate.
Spanish disposals of,the metal over the four-year period
were limited to twenty million ounces, with a base of five and
a maximum of seven million ounces a year.
The five producing signatories contracted to sell no
government silver and to absorb, among them, thirty-five
million fine ounces each year of the period. The silver thus
absorbed did not necessarily have to be used for currency pur-
poses so long as it was retained for the duration of the pact.
A supplement of the pact allocated to the producing countries
their respective shares of the amount they were to jointly ab-
25 Silver , Memorandum of Agreement Between The United
States of America , Australia *, Canada , China, India, Mexico ,
Peru, and Spain , Executive Agreement Series, Number 63, 1933
(Washington, D.C.: United States Qovernment Printing Office, 193!^
(
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sorb. The United States undertook to withdraw 24,421,410 fine
ounces a year; Mexico, 7,159,108 fine ounces; Peru, 1,095,325
fine ounces; Canada, 1,671,802 fine ounces; and Australia,
652,355 fine ounces.
For a time it was doubtful whether Peru would ratify the
agreement. Rumor had it that her quota was more than the
Peruvian Government cared to withdraw,^''' On April 24, 1934,
however, seven days before the amended deadline, the Country
28
signified ratification by giving notice of affirmative action.
A survey of the prior behavior of the signatories shows
that none except the United States undertook either to abstain
from desirable action or to undertake anythirg unusual. In the
period of five years preceding March, 1932, India had disposed
2Q
Of only 127,581,564 fine ounces of silver. The yearly
average amounted to 25,500,000 ounces. The quota, therefore,
permitted a margin of over 35 per cent beyond the average
sales. In 1932, for example, India withdrew twenty-four
30
million ounces.
The Chinese G-overnment had not sold silver and evidently
31had no intention of demonetizing any of, its coinage silver.
26 Log. cit.
27 Commercial and Financial Chronical, Vol. 138, April
14, 1934, p. 2508.
28 Executive Agreemnet Series, Number 63, 0£. cit . , p. 12<
29 Bratter, a£. cit. , pp. 27-31.
30 Loc. cit.

^
While the Idle silver stocks In the vaults of the Bank
of Spain indicated a surplus of the metal there, Spain had not
exported any.^^ In as much as the Country had failed to de-
monetize and sell in the past, even when the metal was bringing
a high price, it would seem as if the limit of forty million
ounces could hardly have been a hardship.
To consider the producing countries, Australia's quota
33
was about 6.5 per cent of her 1932 production. Australia
had coined, however, an average of 260 thousand ounces in the
34five year period, 1927-1931. Canada's quota amounted to a
little over 9 per cent of her 1932 production. Peru s
annual commitmentwas only 10 per cent of her 1933 output, but
36
nearly 16.5 per cent of the 1932 product. However, the
Peruvian Government had desired to issue more silver in 1932,
37
and was only restrained by the Peruvian Central Bank. '
A similar situation prevailed in the case of the Mexican
Government. Under the terms of the pact, that Government under-
took to remove annually the equivalent of 10.4 per cent of
Mexico's 1932 output. Yet, it had voluntarily withdrawn over
three times that amount during the year immediately preceding
31 Bratter, ibid . . pp. 41-42.
32 Ibid., p. 112.
33 See table VI, Appendix.
34 Annual Report of the Director of the Mint . . . 1928 ,
1929 , . . . 1930 , . . . 1931 . . . . 1932 . o^. cit .
35 See table VI, Appendix.
36 Loc . cit .
i
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the Conference. It should "be borne in mind, also, that Mexico,!
of all the countries in the world, had the heaviest relative
economic stake in silver.
The United States, contrary to the example set by all the
other signatories entirely reshaped its recent policies in
connection with the metal. Under the agreement it was to re-
move 103 per cent of its 1932 production. By President
Roosevelt's proclamation, it actually withdrew all of its
•50
annual output. In addition to this very generous gift to the
cause of silver, it acquired even greater quantities of foreign
silver after 1933.
Professor Westerfield was, without doubt, absolutely
correct when he termed the Eight-Nation Pact as nothing more
than a thinly-disguised gift from the Federal G-overnement to
40
the American silver producers.
V THE SILVER P ROCLAMATION OF DECEMBER 21, 1933
In order to satisfy the pact commitments. President
41
Roosevelt issued a proclamation on December 21, 1933. It
I
directed the mints to receive all the current domestic silver
37 Bratter, o^. clt., p. 98.
38 Ibid . , p. 82.
39 See table, VI, Appendix.
40 Westerfield, o^. clt., 4?.
41 Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, Vol.;
78 (United States Government Printing Office, 1934), pp. 614-15.
c
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which might be tendered to them. Half was to be coined into
standard silver dollars for payment to the tenders of the
metal. The other half was to be retained as selgnorage and
used only for monetary purposes until June 1, 1938.
Section forty-three of title III of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 was cited as authority for the procla-
42
mation. It is recalled, however, that the section in
question authorizes "unlimited coinage ... at the ratio so
fixed," but no mention is made of purchases being limited to
current domestic silver. Another questionable feature of the
proclamation was its virtual raTiificatlon of the pact. Whether
this could properly be included within the sphere of executive
agreements without Senate ratification is doubtful. However,
there apparently was no serious objection to the proclamation
on the basis of Either point.
There was instituted no change in the prevailing ratio.
In view of the frequent changes of the weight of the gold
dollar at that time this was a wise decision.
The novel method of pricing resulted in a figure (64.64
cents a fine ounce) of 50 per cent of the monetary value of the
bullion. This arrangement led to the statement that the silver
purchases not only didn't cost the United States a cent, but
netted it a profit equal to the amount paid for the silver.
Of course, the obvious test of this proposition is to determine
how much this "profitable" metal would bring on the open
42 See supra , pp. 35-36.
(
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market. The difference between the mafket value and the value
of the outstanding coins is fiat. As might be expected, this
test entirely escaped the notice of the silver coalition.
At the end of 1933, the outlook for silver was brighter
than it had been in a long time. The government had already
done something for the white metal and there were excellent
chances that it would do still more.

CHAPTER VI
THE SILVER LEGISLATION OF 1934
At the turn of the yesuc the sllverltes were consolidat-
ing their forces and making ready for a big year for silver.
On December 29 » 1933 > twenty-seven senators Issued the state-
ment:
We favor bimetallism, the free and unlimited coinage ,
of both gold and silver at a ratio to be established by law.
This meeting, called by Senator Wheeler, included
twenty-two democrats, four republicans, and one farm laborite.
The majority were from silver states.
I THE GOLD MESSAGE
However, President Roosevelt's message to Congress on
January 15, 1934, recommending legislation on gold, was not
encouraging to the faction. Because he felt more study should
be made of the situation, the President said:
I am, howevey, withholding any recommendation to the
Congress looking to further extension of the monetary use of
silver. .
VYhile he said this after first paying lip service to the
1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle , Vol. 137 » Dec. 30,
1933, p. 2r6o2r:
2 Congressional Record , 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, Vol.
78, pp. 614-15
.
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white metal cause, this was a rather forceful hint that
silver proposals would be most unwelcome. He inferred that
silver was the monetary standard for "probably half the popula-
tion of the world. A glance at the excellent survey done by
Mr. Bratter of the Department of Commerce would have shown
him that only a relatively unimportant fifth of the world's
A
people were on such a standard.
II THE VYHEELER AMENDMENT
The silverites refused to accept the President's hint.
For example, on January 26, Senator Burton K. Wheeler bought
forth his old sixteen to one proposal as an amendment to the
Gold Reserve Act.^ This amendment sought to direct the pur-
chase of not less than fifty million ounces of silver per month
until either the price should have risen to one sixteenth that
of gold or until a billion ounces of the metal should have
been purchased.^ The silver would be held in the Treasury, and
it would be represented by circulating certificates, redeemable
in bullion in units of ten dollars. The next day the measure
7
was only closely defeated.
3 Log. cit .
4 Bratter, 0£. cit., pp. 1-5*
5 Congressional Record , Vol. 78, January 26, 1934,
pp. 1415-T3T^
6 Loc . cit .
7 Ibid., pp. 1464-65.
t:
Ill THE PITTMAN AMENDMENT
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An amendment offered "by Senator Plttman was passed and
Incorporated into the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 as Section
Q
twelve. It permitted certificates to be offered in lieu of the
standard silver dollars specified in Section forty-three of
the Thomas Amendment. In fact, the amendment allowed certifi-
cates to he issued against any silver bullion or standard
silver dollars not held for the redemption of certificates
already outstanding. Seignorage charges might differ for forei^
and domestic silver. The measure authorized the President to
reduce the weight of the silver dollar by the same percentage
as he had the gold dollar. As originally offered, the devalu-
ation pov/er was mandatory, reading:
The weight of the silver dollar shall not be fixed in
any event at more than 60 per cent of its present weight .9
That the bill did little beyond placing one more silver
law on the statute books is evident. The President already had
most of the powers over silver granted anew by this Act.
IV THE PROPOSALS OF DIES AND THOMAS
In times past, subsidies to silver had been obtained
through compromise measures when threats were made to pass
8 Statutes At Large, Vol. 48, 1934 (Washington, D.C:
United States Government P rinting Office, 1934), pp. 337-344.
9 Congressional Record, Vol. 78, o^. cit . , January 27,
|
1934, pp. 1474-75.
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extremely undesirable bills over an administration's veto,-^^
It appesrs that the Silver Purchase Act came about out of just
11
such a situation.
In the House silver bills were proposed by Representa-
l|
tives Dies and Fiesinger. The Dies Bill was especially v/ell sup'
ported. Its advocates argued with an abundance of fiction and
misinterpreted fact that boded ill for the reluctant Adminis-
tration. Perhaps the pork-barrel nature of the Dies proposal
was even more conducive to its passage than the various
^
questionable arguments.
The plan"^^ authorized establishment of an "Agricultural
Surplus Board." Co-operating with this Board, consuls, attaches
and other foreign representatives would make deals for the ex-
change of our agricultural surpluses for silver at whatever
value might be agreed upon. Against the silver acquired,
||
certificates would be issued for payment to the farmers who
furnished the commodities. The maximxim acceptance rate of the
silver was set at 125 per cent of the world market price. The
same limit was established for the monetary value of the
'I silver. The only restraint on the volume of the metal to be
acquired under the scheme was that the aggregate premium on the
j|
silver so accepted should not exceed 400 million dollars a
10 Reference is made here to the Bland-Allison and
Sherman Acts, supra , pp. 8-11.
11 See Congressional Record, op . cit.
,
May 22, 1934,
p. 9211.
12 Ibid., March 19, 1934, p. 4844.
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year. Even if the price of silver should have risen to the
improbable level of sixty cents and the maximum bonus should
have been paid, yearly acquisitions of over 2,666 million
ounces a year would have been permitted.
On the same day that the proposal was first discussed,
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau announced that Professor
James Harvey Rogers of Yale was being sent to China to study
the silver situation there .^-^ The mission was loudly disparaged
by the silver forces as a "stall" on the part of the Administra-
tion. Wheeler, for instance, railed against the move, as "the
heigth of assininity."^'^
A proposal simila r to the Dies Bill was tendered by
15
Senator Thomaq, of Oklahoma, on May second. Submitted as a
rider to a Federal Reserve Bank measure, it sought, aside from
the agricultural surpluses exchange provisions, to make 30 per
cent of the metallic monetary reserves consist of silver.
This reserve figure and the 1926 price level were offered in
place of the annual premium limit of the Dies Bill. It is also
worth noting that the amendment would have permitted the nation-
alization of silver at fifty cents a fine ounce. This was the
price incorporated in the Silver Purchase Act.
13 New York Times, March 20, 1934.
14 Congressional Record , op. cit
.
, March 19, 1934, p.
4814, and passim .
15 Ibid., May 2, 1934, pp. 7909-10.
16 See infra , p. .
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V SECURING SILVER LEGISLATION
In the meantime conferences were being held with various
officials closely connected with the Administration. Finally,
on May sixteenth, nine senators, including Borah, Pittman,
ffheeler, and Thomas (of Oklahoma), met with the President for
|the President first consented to only a purely permissive
measure, then in the end promissed to carry out the wishes of
a direction of Congress.
Speaker of the House Rainey hailed the move as the most
Important concession made by the President during that session
of Congress, and he looked forward to the "bimetallic system."'
The chairman of the group. Senator King, predicted a monetary
conference would come early in 1935 as a result of this
concession.
By the time the bill waspresented on May twenty-second,
it was evident, however, that the more extreme members of the
silver-inflation coalition were anything but satisfied. Such
complaints as Mr. Feisinger's were made as early as the
BJi hour and a half. 17 News filtered through to the press that
Any discretionary feature would be considered as
17 New York Times, May 17, 1934.
18 Ibid., May 18, 1934.
19 Log. cit .
20 Log. cit.
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l»
seventeenth.^*'' At that time he advocated refusing all silver
legislation until the next session when he felt his forces
would be strong enough to write a "proper silver expansion
measure.
'
In his message to Congress recommending the legislation.
President Roosevelt cited the need for a "broader metallic
base" for the currency. However, silver could not possibly
broaden the "metallic base" until it should be accepted as a
24
medium of ultimate redemption • So long as the silver did
not have a market value equal to the nonetary, it could be
nothing more than token currency. In May of 1934, when silver
was around forty-five cents an ounce, the silver dollar was
worth intrinsically only thirty-five cents more than the green-
back.^^
After mentioningthe main provisions of the Silver Act,
the President put the nation at ease on bimetallism by saying
that the double standard would be attained only through the
concert ed action of most of the nations of the world. Despite
his reference to conferences with "some of our neighbors,"
the public considered such International co-operation as
21 Loc. clt.
22 Loc. clt.
23 Congressional Record, op. clt.. May 22, 1934, pp.
9209-10.
24 See infra, pp. •
25 See Figure 2, Appendix.
26 Congressional Record, Loc. clt.
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virtually impossible. His praise of the bimetallic standard
was generally catalogued as a bid for popularity with the
silver interests*
In a long speech, designed to win the support of the
dissatisfied members of the silver-inflation faction, Senator
27
Pittman introduced the bill. His talk contained much that
might be questioned. Among the many other incorrect statements,
a contention appears that Greshams law could not operate
. . • because the history of the purchase of silver
from time immemorial had demonstrated that there is a world q
p rice for silver, when silver is permitted to flow freely. "
One is somewhat taken aback to learn that such reasoning
could exist in the United States Senate. In support of his
contention, the Senator proffered the silver purchase acts of the
past century which were repealed because of the functioning of
29
that very principle, Grreshara's law. An example of a direct
mis-statement is the Senator's declaration that the debtor had
to pay twice as much in products and labor as his money would
30
purchase at the time of the loan.
In reply to Senator Vandenberg, Senator Pittman explained
that the discretionary phrasing of the Act was necessary be-
cause of the effect too sudden a rise in the price of silver
would have on China. This indicates, perhaps, that the oft-
repeated, altruistic purpose of aiding China was not accepted
seriously even by its authors.
27 Ibid., pp. 9210-15.
28 Ibid., p. 9210.
0*
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Senator Pittman praised the measure as a "magnificent
compromise," offered by the President, who wasin sympathy with
31
silver all the time, in spit&'Of the Treasury Department*
However, there is a world of meaning in his remark that:
• • • while this is the President's hill, I do not feel
that the President would desire to claim the entire credit
for it. 32
In this connection the Senator's homage paid to the
Dies Bill is symbolic.
As mentioned before, the bill was attacked severely not
only by "hard-money" men, but also by the more rabid of the
silver and inflation forces who demanded a mandatory measure.
Senator Thomas assailed the Administration's proposal in
bitter sarcasm. -^^ Senator Long in his own habitual, colorful
language commented on the bill:
In common parlance, we have another baby rattle . . .-^
This bill does not, topside, face or bottom, give us
anything at all, not a thing on God's living earth . . .
Even if the President did try to do anything, I do not know
how he could do it under this bill ,^5
Some conservative of rather poor taste inserted into the
29 Ibid., V* 9214. See supra, pp. 11-12,
30 Ibid., p. 9215. See Statistical Abstract of the
United States for 1938, od. cit., pp. 306-316.
31 Congressional Record, op. cit.. p. 9215.
32 Ibid., p. 9210.
33 Ibid., p. 9218.
34 Loc . cit.
35 Ibid., p. 9219-
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Record in the midst of all this the resolution from the Econo-
mists' National Committee on Monetary Policy. The resolution
logically pointed out the folly and unfair subsidy of the silver
program. Its logic, however, was probably a foreign language
to those to whom it was addressed.
Because the bill contained a tax it went first to the
House. There, an amendment to double the proportion of silver
in the metallic stocks failed as did also other liberalizing
amendments. Amid complaints of railroading, the bill was
39
passed on May thirty-first, with 263 in favor and 77 opposed.
Just before the vote. Representative Martin of Colorado
clearly indicated the stand taken by those who supported the
measure:
I Just want to say this, that if this bill becomes a
law and the administration of it goes as far as the law, that
will be far enough, but if the administration of this law
does not go that far, then there will be another Secretary
of the Treasury going \yack to little old New York. [Applause/
In the Senate there was similar debate over the compro-
Al 42
mise with Senators Thomas and Long arguing at great lengths
for amendment. Huey Long was particularly bitter against the
30bld., pp. 9220-21.
37 Ibid . , May 31, p. 10019.
38 Ibid., p. 10001.
39 Ibid., p. 10134.
40 Ibid., p. 10124.
41 Ibid., June 6, pp. 10603-16, 10678-702.
42 Ibid., pp. 10921-33.
i
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50 per cent profits tax, saying Dllllnger would be hung for
4^ 44half that.^ The bill, however, passed the Senate, 55 to 25
»
45
and was approved on June nineteenth.
VI PROVISIONS OF THE SILVER PURCHASE ACT
As finally passed, the Silver Purchase Act of 1934
(H R 9745), expressed it to be the policy of the United States
that silver should constitute one fourth of its monetary
46
stocks. To achieve this goal the Secretary of the Treasury
is authorized to buy silver here or abroad in whatever manner
he deems best, providing that he does not pay a price in excess
of its monetary value. Whenever the price exceeds its monetary
value or silver constitutes more than 25 per cent of the total
monetary stocks, then the Secretary, v/lth the President^ ap-
proval may sell
.
The Act directs the issuance of certificates equal to
the cost of the acquisitions. It states that they shall be
legal tender and redeemable on demand in standard silver
dollars. For their redemption the Treasury is to maintain a
a reserve of silver bullion and dollars equal in monetary
value ($1«29 per ounce unless altered by the President) to
43 Ibid., p. 10931.
44 Ibid., June 11, p. IIO6O.
45 New York Times. June 20, 1934.
46 Statutes At Large, 1934, op. clt.. did. 1178-81.
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1
the aggregate amount of outstanding certificates.
Finally, the Act provides for the nationalization of
silver at no more than fifty cents an ounce. A 50 per cent
tax is to be levied on all profits derived from silver specula-
tion.
On June twenty-first reporters interviewed Secretary
Morgenthau regarding the actual functioning of the new law.
Mr. Morgenthau said that every effort would be made to prevent
speculative activities and a "sensational" price rise.
Confiding that silver had been purchased right along out of
the Stabilization Fund, he said that hereafter the purchases
would be made through the General Fund. Whether or not the
teolume of buying would increase would depend upon offerings
being made at reasonable prices. From this the press gathered
48
that no spectacular developments would occur.
1
1
1
i
1 47 New York Times, June 22, 1934.
48 Loc. cit.
t
CHAPTER VII
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SILVER POLICY
IN 1934 AND 1935
I THE BASES FOR ISSUING SILVER CERTIFICATES
Prior to 1933 » silver certificates were secured by
I
silver dollars containing 371 •25 grains of fine silver. Under
I
1
I
the Thomas Amendment they were issued against war deht
silver at its acquisition price of fifty cents an ounce, so
that each certificate had a reserve of two ounces. The cer-
tificates were placed in circulation in paymnnt of government
2
! obligations • The Secretary of the Treasury was to coin what-
ever silver he felt necessary for the certificates' redemption.
The balance of the silver was to be held in the Treasury for
jthe purpose of maintaining the parity of the certificates.
Once redeemed, they were to be "reissued and paid out again
and kept in circulation . . ." ^
In the proclamation of December 31 » 1933, standard silver
dollars rather than certificates are specified in payment for
1 Title III, Section 45. See supra , pp. 35-37.
2 Statutes At Large , 73rd Congress, 1st Session, 1933
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office,
1933), p. 53.
3 Log. cit.
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1
the silver.^ Of course, payment could "be made in substitute
dollars, and this was actually the case.^ The proclamation
also permittee/ issuance of specie coined from the seigniorage.
The Pittman Amendment to the Gold Reserve Act altered this by
permitting substitution of certificates for the actual specie,
the specie being retained as their reserve.^
The Silver Act permits acquisition of the white metal
with any money, but certificates must be issued at least to the
extent of the cost of purchase, and may be issued to the full
monetary value of the silver. An amendment which proposed to
Q
make the maximum issue mandatory had failed to carry.
Obviously, the conditions of issue were rather confused.
To simplify the situation the Treasury Department took two
major steps. The first, on June 21, 193^ » closely followed
the enactment of the Silver Purchase Act,^ while the second was
promulgated the day after the nationalization order of August
ninth. The first stated that the policy would be to issue
certificates against all the silver only in an amount equal to
4 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury . • •
1934, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1935) p. 210.
5 Leavens, og. cit » , p. 270.
6 Statutes At Large, 1934, op. cit., td. 342.
7 Ibid., p. 1178.
8 Congressional Record, Vol. 78, op. cit., p. 10476.
9 New York Times, June 22, 1934.

61
the metal's cost. On August 10, 1934, a change occurred when
the President directed the Secretary of the Treasury to Issue
1 p
certificates against all the silver on hand. This was done
on the basis of reserving 371 •25 grains of sliver for each
dollar In certificates. The silver had cost about |46,900,000,
so about $80,000,000 worth of certificates were Issued. ^-^
Since then, silver certificates have been issued only to the
14
extent of the cost of the purchases
.
II SEIGNIORAGE
In the discussion thus far we have referred to seignior-
age at several p olnts. This Is the difference between the
cost value and the monetary value of the silver acquired. For
example, In 1939 the government purchased 282.2 million fine
ounces of silver at a cost of 120.5 million dollars. The full
monetary value of the silver amounts to about 564 million
dollars. The seigniorage, therefore, Is about 243.5 million
dollars. This amount of^sllver^certlfIcates could be Issued
beyond the actual purchase price of the metal. However, the
Administration has not deemed it wise to Issue this excess
10 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury . • •
1935 1 (Washington, D. C: United States Governement Printing
Office, 1935) pp. 262-64.
11 New York Times , Loc. clt »
12 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury . . .
1935 * loc. cit.
"
13 Ibid . , pp. 42-3.
14 Loc. clt.
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1
amount. Instead, pursuant to the executive order of August 13
»
1934, it is kept in the General Fund and recorded at cost
value, ''^ i.e., at the smaller figure of 161.7 million dollars,
to return to the example.
The Treasury's announcement of August 10, 1934 stated
that "since the beginning of the G-overnment, the Treasury has
received a total of 38? million dollars in seigniorage."
In the short period of six years following June 30, 1934, an
aggregate of 833.7 million dollars in seigniorage has been
17
accumulated at cost. In as much as the average cost per
fine ounce of silver during the period amounted to about
fifty-four cents, it becomes evident that the seigniorage could
be expanded to reserve about 1.9 billion dollars worth of
certificates
•
III THE DOMESTIC SILVER PURCHASES
After the passage of the Silver Purchase Act, domestic
silver purchases continued to be made under authority of the
President's proclamation of December 21, 1933; that is, at
64.64 cents an ounce. This, in turn, rested on the Thomas
15 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury . . •
1940 (Washington, D.C.: United States G-overnment Printing
Office, 1940), p. 263.
16 Ibid., p. 262.
17 Log. cit
.
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1
Amendment as amended by the Gold Reserve Act of 1934. While
domestic silver could have been purchases under the Silver Act,
the price would have been lower. Consequently, until a manda-
tory price was set by the law of 1939> domestic silver continued
to be purchased under proclamations.
Table III in the Appendix shows that 21.8 million ounces
were purchased during 1934 and that the quantity rose steadily
until 1938. The 1937 amount is nearly three times the amount all
18
allocated to the United States by the Eight-Nation Pact.
IV NATIONALIZED SILVER
As permitted by section six of the Silver Purchase Act,
the Secretary of the Treasury placed an embargo on silver on
19
June 28, 1934. Export of silver was permitted for non-
speculative purposes through a licensing system. This was
done to halt the outward flow of the white metal. Speculators
had been shipping their holdings abroad, mostly to Canada, in
order to evade the profits tax.
On August 9, 1934, the President proclaimed the nation-
alization of the metal, requiring its delivery to the mints
at fifty cents an ounce plus, except for certain holdings
20
exempted. During 1934, 110.6 million ounces were surrendered.
18 Supra, p. 42.
19 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury • • .
1934, op. cit., pp. 210-12.
20 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury . . .
1934. op. cit,, pp. 258-60.
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1
21
Thereafter, the amounts diminished to a mere trickle.
V THE FOREIGN PURCHASES
During the first year of the Act, foreign purchases
aggregated 172.5 million fine ounces at a cost of eighty-six
and a half million dollars." In 1935 » they multiplied to
494.4 million ounces for an all time high. This metal was
purchased in the L ondon Market. The Market accepts bids
and oreders to sell, then each day about noon fixes as official
whatever price will result in the greatest volume of sales .^-^
Abiding by the rules of the Market, the Treasury placed a bid
from day to day and accepted whatever was offered.
Under the impetus of the United States' purchases, the
24
world price rose sharply. At the turn of the year it was fluctu-
25
ating around sixty-four cents. On April 10, 1935, the price
had leaped to sixty-four and one eighth cents, a price nearly
?6
equal to that paid for the current domestic product.
hOn the ninth. Secretary Morgent^u announced that the
world price would be met even if it rose above the domestic
21 See table III, Appendix.
22 Loc . cit.
23 Herbert M. Bratter, The Silver Market. United States
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Trade Promotion
Series, No. 139 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government
Printing Office, 1932), pp. 9-22.
24 See Figure 2, Appendix.
25 New York Times, Jan. 1-24, 1935.
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figure. 27 On the tenth President Roosevelt reduced the seign-
iorage on current domestic production to 45 per cent, making
a price of cents an ounce.- Under this impulse, the
world price rocketed, reaching seventy-one and five eighths
pg
cents an ounce* on April twenty-fourth. " At this time the
30domestic price was revised upward once again to 77.57 cents,
where it was to remain until January 1, 1938. In the meantime,
the world price jumped to eighty-one cents in two days.^"^
After this tremendous puSh the Treasury eased its ac-
tivities and the price was permitted to relax until it averaged
about sixty-five and a half cents during September, October,
32
and November. As will be brought out in Chapter VIIT , these
extremely high prices played havoc with monetary affairs in
several countries.
On December ninth, the Treasury placed no bid on the
33London Market. The price wavered, and on the following day,
26 Commercial And Financial Chronicle, Vol. 140, Aoril
27, 1935, p. 2759.
27 Log. cit.
28 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury . . •
1935, op. cit., pp. 260-^.
29 Commercial And Financial Chronicle, op. cit., p. 2759.
30 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury . . •
1935, op. cit., p. 262.
31 See Figure 2, Appendix.
32 Loc. cit.
33 New York Times, December 10. 1935.
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9
for the first time since the Y/orld War of 1914, London set no
price. After a precipitous decline, it came to rest in
the vicinity of 44.75 cents on January 20, 1936. In general,
this price prevailed for about two years.
34 ibid., December 11, 1935.
35 See Fi^2;ure 2, Appendix; also. New York Times, Jan.
18-26, 1935. . .
ri
CHAPTER VIII
THE EFFECT OF THE SILVER POLICY
ON FOREIGN COUNTRIES
I THE EFFECT ON CHINA
Employing one argument or another, the silver enthusi-
asts continually stressed the pro^erity that would accr'fe to
China from higher silver prices. That actual results would
be quite the opposite was maintained at the time by practically
all American economists, as well as by others in a position
to know and understand the Chinese situation. In fact, it is
probable that the lovi price of silver was the chief reason
why China did not experience to any great degree the world
depression.!
Her prices did not undergo the painful deflation that
wrought havoc in other nations. Even her foreign trade, even
her imports from the United States, were not reduced by so
2
much as was world trade in general. Since there is not time
here to present the case fairly, the reader is justified in
suggesting that things other than the Silver Act might be
1 See, for examule, article by E. Kann in The China Year
Book For 1935 , H. G. W. Woodward, editor (Shanghai: The North-
China Daily News and Herald, Ltd., 1935), PP» 461-65.
2 See Table XI, Appendix.
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responsible. Nevertheless, the fact remains that China's
imports, both in general and from the United States, fell off
sharply after enactment of the Act.
When the world price of silver was artificially and
abruptly forced upward, China's monetary stocks flocked to
3foreign markets. Lessening reserves meant credit contraction
and deflation at a time when Chinese business was using funds
profitable. Because of the decreased credit base and the re-
sultant higher interest, production was curtailed. With this
i
curtailment came both a decreased need for foreign goods and I
I
a decreased means for the purchase of what might be still re-
quired.
China's anxiety over potential attempts to raise and
stabilize the price of silver were noted in the section dealing
4
with the l/?orld Monetary and Economic Conference. When the price
of silver began rising sharply in the summer of 1934, the Nan-
king G-overnment realized silver would be exported.-^ During
August this began to occur in alarming proportions.^ On the
~ 3 Chao-Ying Shih, M.A., and Chi-Hsien Chang, Ph. D.,
editors, The Chinese Year Book. 1936-37 (Shanghai: The Chinese
Year Book Company, 1936) , p. 888. Also, E. Kann, op« cit .
,
|p. 462. For American statistics, see: Foreign Commerce Yearbook
!
l935 1 Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (Washington, D.C.:
ignited States Government Prinitng Office, 1935), P» 271; and
i
Foreign Commerce Yearbook 1937 . Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
iConmierce (Washington, D.C.: United States Q-overnment Printing
Office, 1937), p. 292.
4 See supra , pp. 38 and 41.
5 New York Times, July 23, Sept. 3, 1934.
6 Shih and Chang, 02» cit . , p. 888,
fi
^
nineteenth, Dr. Kung, Finance Minister, cabled the Administra-
tion concerning the difficulty caused his nation hy the United
States' purchase program.*^
During September, Mr. Li Ming, Chairman of the Bank of
China, was in the United States and he pointed out the ill
effects of the silver policy. Feeling that the Silver Act was
passed in the hope of increasing exports to China, he explained
that China's silver
. • . does not help much in her purchases abroad. She
will have to depend upon her exports and her exports alone.
In a new note to America, cabled on October second,
Dr. Kung said about the same thing and asked if our government
couldn't restrict its purchases to American silver for the
9present. Secretary Hull, however, replied that the program
Id
was embodied in an Act of Congress, mandatory in its objectives.
He promised that the purchases would continue in such a way as
to have the least possible ill effect on China. He suggested
"direct governmental transactions" could be arranged. The
Chinese Government might have interpreted this as an invitation
for it to accept the inevitable and sell its silver on its
own account.
7 New York Times, August 19, 1934.
8 Ibid ., Sept. 9, 1934.
9 Ibid ., Oct. 15, 1934.
10 Loc. cit .
11 Loc. cit.
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II THE END OP THE SILVER STANDARD IN CHINA
After receiving this rather discouraging reply,
Minister Kung held a conference with his advisers and then
12
announced a flexible tax on silver exports. This tax was
designed to equal the potential profits on foreign sales of
the metal. However, smuggling and its relaxed enforcement
caused it to be largely ineffective."^^ The Chinese bankers'
14
agreement not to ship silver was very much more helpful.
By the end of 1934, it was apparent that Chinese
monetary affairs were in difficult straits. While it was
15
officially denied, persistent rumors bespoke an impending
change in the system. The Shanghai Exchange Market in 1935
showed marked uncertainty, registered by an ever-widening
spread between rates for cash and forward delivery .''"^ The
British monetary expert, F. Leith-Ross, arrived in Shanghai in
1 17
September, 1935 • Change seemed imminent.
18
The new system was announced on November third.
China, forced by the United States silver policy, renounced
silver for managed currency. The nationalization of all
12 Log. cit
.
13 Shih and Chang, 0£. cit., p. 889.
14 New York Times, April 1. 15. 17. 1935
15 Ibid., December 19, 27, 1934, for example.
16 Ibid., October 25, November 1, 4, 1935.
17 Ibid., September 22, 1935.
*
71
j
i
1
19
silver came with the abandonment of the standard. With the
exception of the Japanese, foreign governments approved
20China's action.
Ill CHINESE SILVER SALES
On December 21, 1935 > Chinese officials admitted for
the first time that shipments of demonetized coin had been
21
made to the United States. It was then reported that the
silver had been consigned to the Chase National Bank and the
National City Bank to provide additional reserves for exchange
22
stabilization.
Earlier in the month, however, a Chinese Government
spokesman was reported to have denounced the United States*
23policy reversal on the matter of prices. As he saw it, Just
as soon as China had revised her monetary system to avoid being
victimized by the artificially high prices, then the United
States drove prices down so that the resulting free silver was
worth only about three fifths its former price.
China succeeded, however, in disposing of at least fifty
24
million ounces while the high price prevailed. When the
18 Ibid., September 22, 1935.
20 Ibid., November, 6, 18; December 13. 1935: February
14, 1936.
19 Ibid., November 5» 1935.
21 Ibid., December 21, 1935.
22 L oc. cit.
23 Ibid., December 13, 1935
r
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transaction was made In November, the price was 65 cents an
ounce, but payment was not made until after deliver. Then the
current price was 45 cents • The difference on this shipment
amounted to Just ten million dollars, and, strangely enough,
this exact portion of the $32,500,000 proceeds, China alloted
25
for gold purchases. Small wonder that Secretary Morgenthau
had the "greatest admiration" for the Chinese methods and
results
•
In April of 1936, a director of the Bank of China, Mr.
K. P. Chen, and his aides carried on a series of discussions
with Secretary Morgenthau relative to the silver situation. '
Rumor had it that silver was to be stabilized as an inter-
28
national monetary unit, and, later, that the United States
would buy substantial quantities of the demonetized Chinese
29
coin. The conferences terminated on the eighteenth of May
with the United States entered into an agreement to purchase
30Chinese silver at the current market price. Secretary
Horgenl^u refused, hov/ever, to reveal the amounts to be pur-
31
chased. The contract was renewed at intervals of six months.
1
24 Ibid., February 14, 1935.
25 Log. clt.
26 Loc. clt.
27 Ibid., April 8, 9, 1935
28 Ibid., April 14, 1935.
29 Ibid., May 15, 1935.
30 Ibid., May 19, 1935.
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Finally, on June 1, 1938, the Treasury stated that over 250
million ounces of silver had been purchased from China since
the initial agreement in May, 1936.32 Much of this, the
announcement added, had of late been in the form of demonetized
coins
•
It is probable that the shipments have been decidedly curi
33
tailed since the latter part of 1938. Japanese forces cap-
34
tured vast hoards of the white metal. Also they have
connived in the smuggling of other silver, and by means of
their blockade they have rendered exportation extremely
difficult.
To sum up, it might be said that our silver policy, in
forcing China to forsake the metal, has definitely curtailed
silver's demand in the future. In addition to this, the
program has rum counter to our foreign policy in so far as it
has furnished the Japanes with the means to purchase no
small quantities of scrap metal, aviation gasoline, and other
war supplies.
I 31 Ibid . , Jan. 1, 1937; July 10, 1937; Dec. 31, 1937;
June 2, 193Fr"Jan. 3, 19, 1939.
32 Ibid . . June 2, 1938.
33 Ibid., Jan. 24, 1941 cites Handy and Harmon, Annual
!Review of the Silver Market for 1940 (New York: privately
printed, 1941) , relative to this.
34 Loc . clt.
t
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IV THE EFFECT ON MEXICO
Mexico was as much Interested in higher silver prices
as was the silver bloc of the United States* In fact, silver
revenues and employment furnished in the mines are eKceedingly
important in the Mexican economy at the present time. As
mentioned above, Mexico produces more silver than any other
315
country in the world.
However, when the Treasury's purchase policy forced the
I
price to the extreme heights it attained in April and May of
jl935, Mexico suffered from an acute small-change shortage. For
it was profitable to melt the peso when silver went above
seventy-two cents a fine ounce.
Faced with this highly inconvenient situation, President
Cardenas, on April 27, 1935 > ordered all silver money called in
hand exchanged for Bank of Mexico notes. The banks were
closed over the following week-end, reopening on the twenty-
"=56
, ninth. The conversion progressed, and by August silver
t 37
jl
currency had been almost completely replaced by paper. To
I
many, it was paradoxical that the world's foremost producer
of the white metal should remove it from its currency.
I 35 Ibid ., April 28, 1935.
36 Ibid., April 30, May 1, 1935.
37 Ibid., August 8, 1935-

75
1
I
During the difficulties of the last of April, Robert
Lopez, Assistant to the Minister of Finance, flew to Washington
38for conversations with Secretary Morgenthau. In a late
statement after an hour's conference on the twenty-ninth,
Sanor Lopez said that Mr. Morgenthau was pleased with Mexico's
legislative adjustments. It was intimated in Mexican circles
that the nationalized silver, with other quantities held as
40
reserves, would be exchanged for United States gold. Since
1931, Mexico had been on managed currency, using gold for
stabilizing its foreign exchange and silver as a reserve for
Its money.
V THE SILVER PURCHASE AGREELdENTS WITH MEXICO
In December, Mexican currency was again in need of
readjustment and Secretary of Finance, Suarez, went to
nyashington to confer with Secretary Morgenthau. On the thir-
tieth, Mr. Suarez announced that further debasement of the p eso
41
had solved the difficulty. The talks were continued until the
^ 4p
sixth of January, 1936, when the Mexican official stated that
43
"a mutually satisfactory agreement" had been reached.
38 Ibid., April 27, 30, 1935.
39 Ibid., April 30, 1935.
40 Loc. cit.
41 Ibid., December 31, 1935.
42 Ibid., January 1, 3, 6, 1936.
43 Ibid., January 6, 1936.
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Beyond that, little was revealed. L ater releases indicated
that the United States undertook to purchase about five million
ounces a month from the Country's current output. At the
time, the secrecy aroused all manner of speculation. It was
even alleged that the United States and Mexico were about to
45
adopt bimetallism.
As 1937 advanced, American and Mexican relations became
steadily less favorable. Mexicans feared United States purchas-
46
es of their metal would cease. According to opinion, if
Mexico refused to abide by the oil agreement or if the oil
wage decision by President Cardenas was unfair to United States
companies, the agreement would be allowed to lapse.
In the hope of securing a renewal of the purchasing
contract upon its expiration, Finance Minister Suarez again
visited Washington for about two weeks in December •^'^ While
the official was in Washington, the Mexican Labor Board's
decision was made public. It required American oil companies
1 48
to increase the workers pay by about a third. Interviewed
44 Ibid., Jan. 11, 1936.
45 Ibid., Jan. 10, 1936.
46 Ibid., Sept. 25, Oct. 18, 1937.
47 Ibid., Dec, 14, 19, 25, 28, 1937-
48 Ibid., Dec. 19, 1937.
I
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by the press, Senor Suarez said this was not of significance
to the silver agreement. He took the occasion to criticise
the American p olnt of view, saying:
They call it Mexican silver, but it's really British
and American silver, because the big silver interests of my
country are all owned by British or American iterests.50
After a final conference on the twenty-eighth, also
attended by Undersecretary Welles and Economist Feis of the
51
Department of State, the agreement was continued. Terms
of the compact included the purchase of five million ounces
of currently mined Mexican silver during January and also the
absorption of the thirty-five million ounces Mexico had accumu-
lated because of the Eight-Nation Pact. While officials in
Mexico city claimed the arrangement was for along period of
time. Secretary Morgenthau took pain to explain that it was
CO
only for one month, subject to extension."^ The purchase
agreement continued through the first three months and then
was halted following the expropriation of oil lands in
53Mexico.
However, the United States continued purchasing silver
from private companies and even from the Mexican G-overnment.
In fact it would have been difficult to prevent this metal
from finding its way to the Treasury without halting all pur-
49 Ibid., December 25, 1937.
50 Log. cit.
51 Ibid., January 11, 1938.
52 Loc. cit.
53 Ibid., March 19, 28, April 1, 1938.
{
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chases of foreign metal. In the fall of 1938, silver was pur-
chased under an arrangement designed to holster our commodity
sales to Mexico. One way or another, Mexico has continued to
market its silver here.
The Importance of this market to the current Mexican
economy is great. The Mexican G-overnment derives directly
55
about eight cents on every ounce of silver mined and exported.
In 1938 Mexico produced about eighty-five million ounces of the
white metal. Our G-overnment purchased nearly all of this,
57first at 45 cents, then at 43 cents an ounce. The total
payment was in the vicinity of thirty-six million dollars, or
58164 million pesos. This is equivalent to over 19 per cent
of the value of the total Mexican exports for that year.-*^^
In 1939 we purchased around eighty million ounces of Mexican
silver for about twenty-eight million dollars.
Writing in the summer of 1939 in Economista, Mexican
conservative monthly, Senor Agustin Aguiar Almada well typifies
the Mexican viewpoint. Should the American G-overnment
suddenly suspend these purchases, argued the writer, the United
States might also suffer. There was the matter of capital
54 Ibid., October 13, 14, 1938.
55 Ibid., February 13, 1940.
56 Agustin Aguiar Almada, "Silver--Mexico ' s Nemesis"
(a translation from Economista), The Living Age, 356:511-14,
August, 1939.
57 Loc. cit.
58 Loc. cit.
59 Loc. cit.
60 New York Times, February 13. 1940.
i
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settlements to be made in connection with the "Mexicanlgatlon"
of Industry. Of equal value in securing silver concessions
was the threat of favoring the Italian and German exporters who
were rapidly taking over what were formerly American markets.
Consequently, for a multiplicity of reasons we have
continued to purchase the Mexican product.
VI OTHER AMERICAN SELLERS
Many American countries mine silver for the United
States market, hut by far the bulk of our imported silver
comes from Mexican and Canadian mines. Canada has been supply-
ing this country with silver under agreement since March, 1936.
At that time Secretary Morgenthau announced that the New York
Federal Reserve Bank was to receive transfers of the white
metal from the Bank of Canada. ^-^ Newspapers claimed the
quantities amounted to fourteen or sixteen million ounces a
64year, but were to be delivered on a month-to-month basis.
Since then the Treasury has stated that acquisitions of the
Canadian metal are made at a rate of two million ounces a.,
month.
61 A. A. Almada, 0£. cit
.
62 Loc. cit.
63 New York Times, March 5, 1936.
64 Ibid., March 5, 6, 8, 1936. New York Herald-Tribune,
March 6, 1936.
I
VII THE EFFECTS OF THE POLICY ELSEWHERE
The general effect of the silver policy has been to
reverse the incipient fcrend back to silver for subsidiary-
coinage. This trend had begun around 1930, when the price of
the metal was low. As its price rose, it became impractical
for minor coinage. Silver coinage was halted and the demone-
tization practice of the World War days was repeated. Nations
turned once again to the more economical paper.
Austria, ^^Danzig,^^ Ethiopia, and Italy^^ were among
the Old World countries forced to v/ithdraw silver. In this
Hemisphere, Colombia, ^9 co sta Rica,'^^ Ecuador, Nicaragua, 72
Peru,*^"^ and Salvadore"*^^ either considerably debased their
silver coins or replaced them outright with paper.
65 New York Times , May 15, 1935.
66 Ibid ., July 31, 1935.
67 Ibid . , August 1, October 20, 1935.
68 Ibid ., June 16, 1935.
69 July 17, 1935.
70 Ibid . , April 8, August 18, 1935.
71 Ibid., May 22, 1935.
72 Ibid., May 15, 1935.
73 Ibid . , December 28, 1935.
74 Ibid., May 25, July 6, 1935-
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CHAPTER IX
SILVER IN CONGRESS, 1936-1939
I THE TH0I(,1AS AND DIES PROPOSALS
One of the important matters before Congress during
the early part of 1936 was the payment of the war veterans'
adjusted compensation certificates. Senator Thomas of
Oklahoma, ever anxious to flood the country with new money,
proposed that payment be made with the silver seigniorage."^
This method, however, would not be mandatory. As he brought
out in discussion, his bill would permit the P resident to
use this seigniorage, or the stabilization fund, or the proceeds
of a bond issue. In fact, the Senator suggested that the
power of using the seigniorage would be employed only as a
2threat to bring the banks to terms on bond arrangements
.
Mr. Thomas estimated there could be issued about |l, 240,000, 000
I ^
I
in certificates.-'^ The bill was voted on the eighteenth
'after a supporting speech by Senator Frazier, an inflationist,
" 1 Congressional Record, Vol. 80, 74th Congress, 2nd
session, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1936) p. 211.
2 Log. cit.
3 IMd., p. 210.
4 Ibid . , pp. 669-70.
I
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and it was rejected 27 to 64,
Still desirous of getting silver certificates into
circulation, Senator Thomas offered another bill for that
5
purpose in March. This one wonild have retired all the green-
backs, silver certificates, issued against future seigniorage,
being exchanged for them. The bill died in committee, however.
A silver proposal offered by Senator Borah had a
similar death. In this commodity dollar measure, offered in
June of 1936, he proposed still greater acquidtions of the
white metal. These new acquisitions were to aggregate one
billion dollars in the next five-year period, providing
that the value of the silver holdings should not increase
beyond 25 per cent of the gold stocks. Also, there was a
price limit of |1.29 an ounce.
II ATTACKS ON THE SILVER PROGRAM
The only legislative threat to the silver program in
1936 came in a bill for its repeal offered by Representative
i
Bacon of New York, and the bill was never reported out of
7
committee. The Economists' National Committee on Monetary
Policy, however, published a denunciatory statement which might
well have aroused more serious opposition. On May twenty-fifth,
•three days before the Bacon Bill was presented, the Committee
5 Ibid., p. 3473.
6 Ibid., pp. 10364-65.
7 Ibid., p. 8278.
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recommended in a resolution Intended for Congress that all
Q
silver purchases be halted immediately. In addition, it asked
for the repeal of the President's authority to re-establish
bimetallism and to effect other silver subsidies. The statement
pointed out that silver purchases and the consequent issue of
I
certificates diluted, rather than strengthened, the metallic
I
base ( gold)
•
In a speech of a rather caustic nature, Senator Pittman
'attempted refutation the same day.^ His speech contained so
j many questionable statements that rebuttal here is out of the
[question. His fellow senators could hardly have given it
i
serious consideration. For instance, he told them that China
j lost her silver because she attempted to stop its export, and
j' that we needed the silver because of the scarcity of gold,
j
The Senator promised a report from his special monetary in-
vestigating committee in the near future. This would supposed-
li
jily furnish undeniable proof of the wisdom of the silver
1
purchases. However, little more was heard of silver in 1936.
In 1937 » two abortive attempts were made on the silver
'program, one by Mr. Bacon in January, "^^ and another by Senator
jTownsend in August. '''^ These two were aimed directly at the
|, Silver Purchase Act of 1934. Senator Townsend offered two
8 New York Times, May 25, 1936.
9 Conp;ressional Record , Vol. 80, o^. cit., pp. 7875-76.
10 Congressional Record, Vol. 81, 74th Congress, 3rd
Session (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1937), p. 289.
I
11 Ibid., pp. 8163-64.
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additional resolutions: one was to cancel the President's
powers to devalue the silver dollar and to provide for its un-
limited coinage, and the other was to investigate the monetary
situation in relation to silver. ^-^ It is worth noting, in
connection with this last, that Senator Pittman's special
silver committee was still in dormant existence. His promise
of an early committee report in the speech of May 25, 1936 had
proved barren.
Ill THE EXTENSION OF THE SUBSIDY
The proclamation which set the domestic silver price at
77 •57 cents a fine ounce terminated on December 31 > 1937-
As the time drew near. Senator Pittman and others of the silver
bloc began a desultory campaign for the continuance of the sute-
14
sidy. Senators Pittman and King made their usual type of
silver speech from time to time, and the Tri-State Miners'
Association petitioned the P resident to retain the high price
Opposition was met in a speech by Representative Tabor
and in a statement issued by Dr. Walter E. Spahr of New York
University. There was little doubt, however, but that a new
Proclamation would be forthcoming. The Treasury Department had
15
12 Ibid., p. 8164.
13 Log. cit »
1-^ Ihid. , pp. 219,28 and 922-25.
15 New York Times , Dec. 14, 1937
16 Ibid ., Dec. 24, 1937.
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promised the Issuance of one and there oy made any intensive
campaign useless •'''^
The proclamation was finally Issued on December thirty-
first, and rather unexpectedly reduced the price of current
1
8
domestic silver to 64,64 cents a fine ounce. Patrons of
the white metal raised only a temporary clamor, apparently
considering themselves fortunate to find the subsidy still in
existence."'"^
Unless renewed the Eight-Nation Silver Pact was to
terminate also at the end of the year. It was abundantly
evident that other governments were not al all interested in
20
Its extension. Therefore, it was not at all a surprise when
the Pact quietly died by default at the appointed time. The
purchasing of the Mexican quota by the United States, has
21
already been mentioned.
IV THE PITTMAN EXCHANGE PLAN
Silver played a very minor role in the third session of
the seventy-fifth Congress. Mr Tabor brought it to the atten-
tion of his fellows, however, by his dogged attempts to
22
strike out each silver appropriation as it came up. He
17 Ibid., Dec. 8, 14, 27, 1937.
18 Ibid., Dec. 31, 1937; Jan. 1, 1938.
19 Ibid., Jan. 1, 2, 1938.
20 Ibid., Dec. 14, 1937 is a good example. Probably
most governments were anxious to sell their silver to thc'U. S.
21 See supra , p. 77.
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received some applause, twenty votes, and, along with his
colleague, Mr. Dltter, all mannerof arguments from the sllver-
Ites . Representative Barton offered a bill to repeal the
23
Silver Purchase Act.
Later in the year, the press carried a curious plan
?4
offered by Senator Pittman. He proposed that the surplus
cotton "be exchanged for silver in foreign markets, at ten
pounds of cotton per ounce of silver. Certificates would be
issued against the silver thus acquired and paid to the farmers
for their cotton.
At that time cotton was selling for about 8.25 cents
a pound. '^^ Silver was currently quoted at 42.75 cents an
ounce. On this basis the foreign importer would be paying
only 4.27 cents a pound for 8.25 cent cotton. At the same
time, because the ounce of silver would have a United States
monetary value of |1.29, the farmer would receive the handsome
price of almost 13 cents a pound. Thus both the seller and the
purchaser would enjoy unusual prosperity.
Mr. Pittman denied any truth in the "silly cry of
inflation" which would be aroused. The reason he offered is
•
22 Conp;ressional Record, Vol. 83* 7'5th Cons^ress, 3rd
Session (Washington, D.C.: United States G-overnment Printing
Office, 1938), pp. 592-598, 602-603, 644-48, 653-54.
23 Ibid., p. 810.
24 New York Times. Sept. 28. 1938.
25 ll)id., Sept. 27, 28, 29, 1938.
26 Log . cit>
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rather mystifying. He pointed out that the | 864, 000, 000 woUth
of silver certificates he expected the plan to entail, would
amount to less than 10 per cent of the billion dollar national
income figure, hoped for by the Administration'. Fortunately,
no official cognizance of the plan was ever taken.

CHAPTER X
THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
SILVER SUBSIDY IN 1939
The year, 1939 > was a very important one in the progress
of the silver policy. During this year the white metal re-
ceived more attention than it had previously enjoyed since the
Silver Act of 1934.
I THE THREAT OF REPEAL
The first publicity it obtained, however, was most
unwelcome to the silver bloc. On January fourth, Senator
Towns end moved against the policy through a resolution provid-
ing for its investigation."^ This resolution, which called for
||
a ten-man committee, cited forty-six evils arising from the
Silver Purchase Act. While it was in committee, it was
rendered ineffective through a clever move by Senator Pittman.
He successfully requested that Senator Townsend, with three
others, be placed on his Senate Special Silver Committee of
2
! August sixteenth, 1935* He again promised action by his
committe within a few days.
i Joint Resolution Providing; for the Appointment of a
Special Joint Committee to Investigate the Silver Program and
for Other Purposes . Senate J R - 1, Jan. 4, 1939.
I
2 Congressional Record , Vol. 84, 76th Congress, 1st Ses-
sion (Washington, D.C.: United States G-overnment Printing Office
1939), p. 357.
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Checked in his first play, Senator Townsend introduced
'i
: on January seventeenth a hill to revoke the President's
authority to revalue the silver dollar and to continue purchas-
3
j
ing silver. Sale of surplus Treasury stocks was to he
permitted at whatever prices should be deemed "best."
Continued imports of silver would be forbidden. The Senator
thought the Treasury should retain 500 million ounces of the
hoard as sufficient for the next century's coinage require-
ments. He further suggested that $250,000 be appropriated
for research looking toward an expansion of non-monetary uses
of the metal.
j
Two days later, on the nineteenth, Senator Pittman
countered with an amendment to the Townsend Bill designed to
4
alter the Silver Act in a quite different manner. The Act,
as amended, would peg current domestic silver at |1.29 an ounce.
The present price of the foreign metal would be retained, but
this non-domestic product would be accepted only in payment
for American exports. The 50 per cent tax on profits would be
eliminated as having the effect of destroying the domestic
silver market. In seeking to relate surplus commodities and
the silver subsidy, Senator Pittman again reverted to the
old Dies idea.
As the year advanced, silver continued to get attention.
3 New York Times , Jan. 18, 1939.
^ I"bld ., Jan. 20, 1939.
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On February second, the Plttman Investigating Committee
' arranged fcr conferences with Secretary Morgenthau. In
testimony the Secretary said the purchases under the Act had
Increased the buying power of such sliver producing countries
as China, Mexico, Canada, Peru, Chile, and the Philippines.
Under pressure from Senator King, the Secretary said he was
unaware of Mexican silver being sold to the Treasury. He
pointed out that the Treasury broke off its Mexican agreement
in March of 1938, However, he bolstered up the popular belief
that the Mexican product was really being sold here by stating,
"We have no way of knov/ing the origin of the silver."
At the first of June, Senator Townsend was still con-
tinuing his fight against the Silver Purchase Act. On the
seventh he offered another amendment to a bill which sought to
extend the President's devaluation and stabilization powers.
Less ambitious than some of its predecessors, this amendment
would not have altered domestic purchases*
II THE SILVER BLOC AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S
EMERGENCY POWERS
In May the President conferred with Senator Miller, of
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, concerning the
5 Ibid ., Feb. 3, 1939.
6 Ibid ., Feb. 8, 1939.
7 Ibid ., May 16, 1939.
c
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extension of his emergancy powers over money.® The Treasury
evidently considered this as acgood time to put out a bid for
the support of the silver bloc. To this end it mentioned
having moved for extension of Title III of the Thomas Amend-
9
ment» This part permitted the unlimited coinage of silver and
was the basis for the domestic purchases by proclamation.
Early in June, Senators Glass and Wagner appeared as the
opposing leaders in the fight over the President's monetary
powers. With Senator Glass stood Byrd and Adams, the last
named actually offering the bill for ending the powers.
A surprise move came when Senators Thomas and McCarran
10
offered an amendment to the stabilization bill. Among other
things, the amendment proposed to make the purchase of domestic
silver mandatory at |1.04 an ounce, an increase of more than
60 per cent over the prevailing subsidy price. Also, foreign
silver offered in return for surplus commodities would be
accepted at 25 per cent above its market price. Incidentally,
the bill discarded the stabilization fund and the devaluation
authority. On the sixteenth, the two Senators in statements
to the press named nine other senators, for the most part
members of the silver bloc, who v/ere determined to see their
11
measure enacted. While there was little possibility of
8 Ibid., May 16, 1939.
1
i
9 Loc. clt.
10 Ibid., June 16, 1939.
11 Loc. clt.
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passage for their bill, it sufficed as a powerful bargaining
j lever.
The silver senators had demanded a statement of price
Intentions on the part of the Treasury. Secretary Morgenthau
stated he would set no price until passage of the Administra-
tion's measure was secured. Nevertheless, it was rumored that
the silver enthusiasts would probably gain some sort of a con-
I
jcession.
On June twentieth, there were indications that the
silver bloc was organized for a filibuster against the Adminia-
12
trationb measure. Senate leaders felt certain that the
possibility might be avoided by an increase in the price of
domestic silver to around seventy-seven cents an ounce. The
next day the filibuster began with a five-hour recital of
13American monetary history by Senator Thomas of Oklahoma. In
the meantime his partner from Nevada, Senator McCarran, carried
14
on cloak-room diplomacy.
The filibuster was temporarily suspended on the following
day to permit the passage of a tax bill. It was generally
believed that this friendly gesture toward the Administration
was made to pave the way for a compromise offer. The Treasury
was reported to have offered a pledge that the new price would
12 Ibid ., June 20, 1939.
13 Ibid . , June 22, 1939. Also, Congressional Record ,
Vol. 84, 02. cit., pp. 7591-7626.
14 New York Times , loc. cit.
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not be below seventy cents. The sllverltes, on the other
hand, were supposed to be considering seventy-seven cents as a
• minimum.
A compromise was again offered with an administration
offer to peg the domestic price at sixty-four cents. According
to a statement by Senator Barkley, the offer was flatly re-
16
jected and tte seventy-seven cent figure was repeated. Other
members of the group, however, were reputed to have privately
suggested that 64.64 cents, if mandatory, would be acceptable.
At any rate, the filibuster went on and an offer for a vote on a
17
Pittman silver amendment was not a ccepted. This particular
amendment specified a mandatory price of $1.27 an ounce.
Ill THE INITIAL SILVER VICTORY
On Monday, the twenty-sixth, the silver forces reaped
a harvest. The bloc halted its filibuster for a vote on the
18
Pittman Amendment. This was defeated as expected. Then a
compromise measure penned by Senator Addams was offered. The
compromising, though of course pre-arranged, was carried on
right in the Senate. As soon as his price of $1.27 was
rejected, 52 to 26, Senator Pittman offered a new amendment
presented by McCarran at almost the same moment. This was
15 Ibid., June 23, 1939.
16 Ibid., June 24, 1939.
17 Loc. clt.
18 Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 7859.
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like the preceding l^y^changed the price to 77 •57 cents .^9
Then Senator Adams of Colorado, leader against the Adminis-
tration's monetary measure, incorporated the amendment into
his own which would revoke the devaluation power. Senator
Pittman appeared rather confused and seemed to have expected
21
separate votes, each clique supporting the other.
By vote of the Senate, 39 to 35 » the merged amendment
22
was divided into its components. Barkley kept up his oppo-
sition only a little longer, and then the two branches were
23
voted. The revaluation branch carried 47 to 31, while 48
votes were cast in favor of the silver amendment against 30
24
.opposed.
Senator Townsend, who had voted for the former, offered
an amendment to discontinue further acquisition of foreign
silver. Strangely enough, the amendment was actually passed,
supported by some members of the silver bloc. °
A survey of the roll call vote shows quite
obviously that there really was a horse-trade on a large scale.
Only two Republicans, Townsend and Tobey, voted against the
19 Loc. cit.
1
20 Ibid., pp. 7860-62.
21 Ibid., p. 7860.
22 Ibid., p. 7865.
23 Ibid., p. 7867.
24 Ibid., p. 7868.
25 Ibid., p. 7877.
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first silver measure. Only one of the silver bloc. Senator
Borah of Idaho, voted against the Adams amendment which sought
to end the devaluation power.
Of course, there was no prophesying how the silver bill
would make out in conference. However, the Senate compromise
practically assured silver of great concessions. The amend-
ment concerning foreign silver caused great consternation in
Mexico,^''' and it was generally felt that the Department of
State would not like it. As for the President, he went fish-
p o
ing. It became apparent, though, that President Roosevelt
was really concerned over the discontinuance of foreign pur-
chases because of their diplomatic leverage over certain
"good neighbors," particularly Mexico.
The fact that the domestic purchases were merely a
sop became steadily more obvious. Occasionally, this was
intimated by even the silver group. On the twenty-eighth, for
example. Senator Pittman made a statement to the press pointing
out that he had voted "for appropriations for billions of
dollars to make losing loans and pay bonuses to agriculture •
. .
" All this he had done altruistically for it "did not
benefit my. State." [italics oursJ In return for this support,
26 Ibid ., p. 7881.
27 New York Times , lune 27, 1939.
28 Loc. clt.
29 Ibid . , July 1, 1939.
30 Ibid . , June 29, 1939.
31 Loc. cit
I,
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silver ought to receive similar consideration.
,1
i IV THE FINAL COMPROMISE
i|
On the twenty-eighth the Senate hill was rejected by
the House and it went to conference. In the interim the price
of silver had continued to slump. In two days it had fallen
70
from 43 to 38.5 cents an ounce, about a 10 iDer cent drop.
A day later it was at 38 cents. On the whole, the ma.rket was
very much steadier than It had been expected to be.
On June thirtieth, the conference report was brought
34to the Senate. It provided for continuation of the stablliza-
tlon fund. This was the only Important concurrence with tie
Senate's action of the twenty-sixth. It also continued
until June 30, 1941, the power of further devaluating the
dollar. The Senate members likewise capitulated on the price
of domestic silver. The conference report increased the seign-
iorage to 45 per cent, resulting in a price of 71 -H cents a
fine ounce. Because Senators Vandenburg, Barbour, and Tydings
kept up a filibuster until after midnight, when the laws in
question expired, no immediate action was taken. Just
before two A.M. the Senate adjourned until July fifth.
32 Metal Statistics , 1940 (New York: American Metal
Market Company, 1940) , pp. 260-61.
; 33 Log. cit.
34 Congressional Record, or*, cit., p g-'lOS
35 Ibid,, pp. 8415-8434.
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Opinion was divided as to whether or not the coalition
would break up with the silverites supporting the conference
report. The break actually came when the majority of the
silver-inflation faction felt it advisable to yield and to
accept the 71»11 cents. The acceptance was not at all unani-
mous, however. Senator Ashurst, for instance, voted against
the report and declared:
. . .if this conference report, this miserable com-
promise, be rejected, the conferees v;ill bring in a report
fixing the price of domestically mined silver at 77.57 cents
an ounce, or higher. 37
McCarran of Nevada was equally confident that better
things could be gained through waiting and he bitterly assailed
the lower price, styling it a "sop." He inferred that 77.57
cents would not have been that. With a plea that "it is the
silver dollar that made America," he implored his fellow
senators to vote down the lower price on "principle."
The silverite of greatest influence
,
however, felt that
the chances of ultimate defeat were too great to warrant
further trading. Asking that the compromise be accepted,
Senator Pittman told how he had finally promised Senator
40
Barkley, the majority leader, he would support this report.
The price of support was the mandatory figure of 71*11 cents
fTTbid . , p. 8567.
37 Ibid ., p. 8551.
38 Ibid . , p. 856I.
39 Ibid ., p. 8562.
^0 Ibid., p. 8563.
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finally incorporated in the report. This was roughly half-
way between 64.64 and 77«57 cents. Saying, "I know that the
Secretary of the Treaaury is not only prejudiced against
II 41domestic silver, but he is vindictive, ' Mr. Pittman sug-
gested that the white metal was fortunate to gain any conces-
sion at all.
The report was voted a little before five (the agreed
upon time) and it carried, 43 to 39.^^ A majority of the silver
senators supported it. From the bloc, only Adams, Ashurst,
Johnson (of Colorado), and McCarran voted against the report.
On the twenty-seventh of July, Senator Townsend offered
one of his by now rather common-place bans on foreign
43
purchases. It was defeated with 38 votes cast for it and
4441 against it. Almost all of the silverites voted in opposi-
tion.
V THE COURSE OF SILVER
The silver policy moved along smoothly throughout 1939*
Of course, little was bought during the anxious days of the
compromise. At that time, however, as pointed out above,
the world price remained more stable than might have been
expected. Until June 26, it remained at 42.75 cents on the
41 Ibid., p. 8562.
42 Ibid . , p. 8567.
^3 New York Times, July 28, 1939.
44 Congressional Record , op . cit. , p. IO335.
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New York market. On the three following days It dropped to
37 .75 where it rested two days .^^
After this no price was issued until July sixth,
following passage of the amendment .^"^ The new figure was 36.5
cents. At the time it was suggested that if the price had
48
"been set much higher, dumping would have occurred. . On the
tenth the Treasury established foreign silver at 35 cents, and
the price is still effective .'^^ However, the Treasury had an
agreement with many producers whereby it paid eight cents an
ounce more if the silver should be refined in the United
States .^"^^ Most South American producers, along with many
Canadian and Mexican miners, availed themselves of the enhanced
price .^-^
In accordance with the Treasury price, the market
settled at 34.75 cents. Due to the fear of impending war, the
52
price began an upward surge on August tenth. On the twenty-
fifth, it peaked at 39*75 cents which proved to be the half-
year s high.-^-^ The price has fluctuated, but only negligibly
since November of 1939.
45 Metal Statistics, op. cit., p. 260.
46 Loc. cit.
47 New York Times, July 7, 1939.
48 Loc. cit.
49 Ibid., ^uly 11, 1939.
50 Ibid., August 25, 1939.
51 Loc. cit.
>
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VI THE NEAR DEFEAT OF THE SILVER PURCHASE ACT
At the beginning of 1940 Senator Tov/nsend presented hia
customary ban on foreign-silver buying. Senator Barkley
opposed it and pointed out that the matter "involves our
foreign policy, as well as purchases here by nations who have
been sending us silver."
On the twentieth, the Federal Reserve System's Advisory
eg
Council unanimously endoreed the Townsend Bill,- In a state-
ment the Council said it had noted the bill was before the
Senate Banking Committee and forthwith sent this resolution.
The resolution pointed out the fact that the silver purchases
Increased the "already excessively large bank reserves."
Later, on March ninth the New York State Chamber of Commerce
Issued a resolution favoring the Twwnsend Bill.-^'
The Administration appeared to have every hope of the
bill's failure. Before the silver purchases v/ere begun,
President Roosevelt very likely was not in favor of them.
Should they be halted now, however, our neighbors to the South,
especially Mexico, could well retaliate by turning to Nazi
52 Metal Statistics, op* cit., pp. 262-66« Also,
Annual Report of the Director of the Mint . . . 1940, op. cit..
p. 85.
53 Loc. cit.
54 New York Times, Jan. , 1940.
55 New York Times, Jan., 1940.
56 Ibid., Feb. 20, 1940.
57 Ibid.. March 10. 1940.
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Germany, in so far as the blockade would permit. At any rate
such cessation would not aid the Hemisphere solidarity program.
Consequently, it is not strange that Senator Wagner,
Administration henchmen and Chairman of the Senate Banking
and Currency Committee, wanted neither the Townsend bill nor
the slated investigation of the silver purphases. On the
nineteenth of March the V/agner Committee was to hold a stormy
session. At this meeting Senator Wagner clashed sharply with
58
Senator Tobey over the silver investigation. He suggested
the complicated nature of such a matter as reason for the long
delay. Exploded Mr. Tobey, "The complicated matter be damn-
ed!" and he later strode from the room.
At the meeting Secretary Morgentau repeated his for-
eign trade argument, but it was very evident that he really
I
wished to emphasice the importance of the policy to diplomatic
matters. He used such expressions as "friendly relations,"
60
"troubled conditions," and " foreign relations." Of course,
this further bears out the theory that the Administration has
ijdesired continuance of the foreign silver buying for diplo-
matic reasons.
The about-face in the line of argument offered by the
Treasury Department is rather interesting. Contract purchases
I
were long continued with the Mexican G-overnment after the
58 Ibid ., March 20, 1940.
59 Loc . cit.
60 Loc. cit.
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"Mexican! zation" of Industry had interfered with American
interests there. When the G-overnment was criticised for this
continuation, a Treasury spokesman on December 30 » 1937
Implied that the internal affairs of foreign countries and
foreign policy were the concern of the State Department and
61definitely not that of the Treasury.
Senator Townsend filed a statement showing our folly
In exchanging valuable goods for the silver which would be
worth little whenever our purchase program should cease.
There was also a statement filed by Senator Pittraan. A
masterpiece of turned-about reasoning, it sought to use Chair-
man Eccles ' statements to support the purchases.
Despite the Administration's desires, the bill was
favorably voted, fourteen to four, by a committee that would
not be railroaded.^2 Senator Wagner, who voted against the
63
recommendation, even predicted passage by both houses.
Finally, over a month later, the bill was reported out
.
64
of committee on April 30, 1940. The way was cleared for
it and it seemed to have very bright possibilities. As
expected, it met with sever o-oposition by both the silver bloc
and the Administration's forces. Senator Barkley, evidently
hoping to enlist the silverites into service, remarked that
61 Ibid., December 31, 1937.
62 Ibid., March 21, 1940.
63 Loc. cit.
64 Ibid., May 1, 1940.
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"it would be more difficult to sustain the domestic price
if the foreign price goes any lower. II 65
Senator Thomas of Utah pitched into the "battle on be-
half of the bloc* Senator Pittman offered an amendment to
the Townsend Amendment. Senator Reynolds, joining Townsend,
stated the purchases were of chief benefit to Mexico, "a
68
nation very unfriendly to us." Whereupon, Barkley inter-
posed on behalf of the supposed agricultural benefits derived
from sales of surplus farm commodities to the foreign vendors
69
of silver.
Debate continued from time to time, and on the ninth of-
70
,May the bill came to a vote. First Senator Pittman s amend-
71 72
ment was defeated,' then the Townsend bill passed. Plans
were made in the House by the enemies of the measure to block
it as a revenue measure arising in the Senate ."^^ When the
middle of June had passed with no action in the House on the
bill, a Senate Committee attached it to a tax measure. '^^
The effort proved futile, for, as yet, nothing has come
of the bill.
65 Ibid ., May 2, 1940.
66 Congressional Record , Vol 86, 76th Congress, 3rd
Sess ion, (V/ashington, D.C: United States Government Printing
Office, 1940) pp. 5393-5400, et passim *
67 New York Times, May 2, 7, 1940.
68 Ibid . , May 7, 1940.
69 Loc. cit.
70 Congressional Record, ojq. cit . , p. 5826.
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VII THE OPPOSITION OP THE
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
The principal recent opposition to the silver prosram
has come from Chairman Eccles and his Federal Reserve Board.
Putting forward a thirteen-point reform program on December
75
fourth, he urged discontinuance of purchases of foreign silver.
Unprecedented, it was issued jointly by Federal Reserve tank
presidents, the Board of Governors, and the Federal Advisory
Council
.
The report, among other things, recommended that
monetization of foreign silver should cease. It also sought
to remove "the power to issue silver certificates against the
seigniorage ... on previous purchases of silver." It
stated that this potential seigniorage issue amounted to
11,500,000,000.
71 Ibid ., pp. 5825-26.
72 Ibid . , p. 5826.
73 New York Times, May 10, 25, 1940.
74 Ibid., June 16, 17, 1940.
75 Ibid . , Dec. 4, 1940.
76 Ibid . , Jan. 2, 1941.
77 Loc . cit.
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VIII THE OUTLOOK
Despite the high repute of those who promulgated the
resolution, there is little hope that any great change will
be effected. On June thirtieth of this year the unusual presi-
dential powers over the monetary system will again terminate.
At the same time the domestic silver subsidy will come before
Congress as a part of the ending legislation, and this should
focus attention upon the entire silver program. However, it
would seem unlike ly that the foreign purchase policy would be
scrapped at a time when the goodwill of our "neighbors" is more
important than ever before. Perhaps, purchases will be limited
to silver mined in the Western Hemisphere.
With the great upturn in metal production, accompanied
by some price advances, there appears to be little reason for
continuing the domestic subsidy. Of course, some states,
especially Nevada, mine their silver from straight-silver ores,
and this bodes no good. Also, Nevada, along with certain other
Western states east of the Pacific tier, probably has a
minimum of defense business other than mining. This may prove
to be a decisive factor in an inexcusable continuation of
domestic purchases.
78 Since this thesis was written, the domestic silver
program has been continued and the foreign has not been halted.
(July, 1941)
r
CHAPTER XI
EVALUATION OF THE SILVER POLICY
I
An Idea of the magnitude of the silver purchases has
already been given. In the first chapter the hoard was
'I described in a way that was hoped would emphasize its tremen-
jdous, unprecedented size. However, notwithstanding the great
magnitude of these acquisitions, the one to three goal of the
Silver Purchase Act has not been attained. In fact, because
of the devaluation of gold and the vast Inflow of that metal,
silver constituted only about 16.5 per cent of our monetary
precious metal stocks on June 30, 1940. In June of 1933*
before the program was really begun, silver comprised about
14.6 per cent of these stocks. The statistical data presented
in the Appendix further analyze and describe the accumulations
with reference to volume and source.
'i
I Many reasons were given why the United States should pur-
chase silver. Practically all of them were premised on the
I
theory that such a program would effect, or help to bring
about prosperity. A prominent reason was that the economy
suffered from a lack of money. Consequently, prices were low,
bringing depression.
An allied reason was that our money suffered from too
limited a "metallic base." Some people, particularly those
from agricultural regions, wished for inflation and saw silver as
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the most feasible means for this. Some saw the depreciated
silver as having depressed the currencies of the silver-using
countries, thereby reducing their imports, and causing world-
wide depression.
j
I SILVER AND THE PRICE L EVEL
I With the New Deal came the popular conviction that if
the price level could be raised to its 1926-29 level, then the
good times of those years would automatically be present. Thus
i the usual accompaniment of prosperity was confounded with the
cause of prosperity and with prosperity itself.
Silver enthusiasts argued that silver purchases would
force prices upward. The price level in the United States
and in the world did rise, but indication is lacking that this
was due to our acquisitions of the white metal. Our foreign
purchases of silver amounted to only 972 million dollars
i
during a period of six and a half years beginning with 1934.
This figure is obviously insignificant in comparison with the
general world commodity purchases of the period.
Silver was supposed to raise American prices, in
particular, by expanding the supply of money. Less than 1.4
ibillion dollars, however, were injected into circulation from
this source during the fiscal years, 1934 through 1940.
During the same period the total money in circulation increased
by more than 2.1 billion dollars. The silver money quite
possibly replaced a similar quantity of the more elastic
f
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Federal Reserve notes. Also, credit is much more important
than currency to the price level of our economy
•
If it could be shown that the silver program resulted
in a higher price level, this would hardly indicate that silver
purchases contributed to a return of prosperity. The majority
of economists never accepted the price-prosperity theory
put forth by the present Administration. Apparently even
the New Deal, itself, gave up the theory that a general and
artificial rise in prices would correct the maladjustments of
our economy and lit- it from the stagnancy of depression.
II SILVER AND PURCHASING POWER
The silver interests also claimed that the affixing to
silver of a tale value greatly in excess of its non-monetary
value would increase the public's purchasing power. On the
face of it, it is an intriguing idea. The people would bring
thir;^y-cent silver to the mints and rush away with a great
deal more purchasing power. The mafic wands of the federal
mints would convert the white metal from thirty cents an
ounce to a dollar and twenty-nine cents an ounce.
Right here, however, lay the fallacy. Bona fide
purchasing poweris the result ofproductive activity and it is
measured ultimately in terms of the goods it will command.
Writing up the value of all commodities would tend to cancel
itself out in the form of higher prices in general, not in
greater economic activity and well-being.
It is true, of course, that the miners would gain in
r
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purchasing power relative to their former position, and because
silver is regionally centralized in limited areas, they were
benefited in a way comparable, perhaps, to relief workers.
It should be borne in mind, though, that silver's status as
a by-product would prevent the working of most mines for a
mere sale of the argentiferous product. Because the mine and
refinery workers constitute but a negligible part of the gain-
fully employed, and because their region is not of great
significance to the business activity of the nation as a
whole, little national benefit accrued from this.
Ill SILVER AS A MEDIUM OF INFLATION
Inflationists such as Senator Thomas of Oklahoma
supported the silver program, evidently accepting it as the
best means to their ends. The relative importance of credit,
however, suggests that the expansion of credit, supposing
Inflation to be desirable, would be the agency to employ for
this. Even if currency were to be used, then tbe greenbacks
would have served quite as well at infinitely less expense.
For silver is pure fiat to the extent that its tale value exoeeda
its commercial value in the world market. Furthermore, silver
perhaps constitutes a more treacherous form of inflation or
potential inflation than paper. Clever speakers can easily
hoodwink many into believing that the country is actually
issuing "hard" money and at a profit under the silver purchase
program. Further, the seigniorage remains on the books as an
invitation to a harassed Congress to pay its bills the easy
r
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way. Fortunately, however, the amount of inflation possible
from this source at the present time, so long as the silver
dollar is not greatly devalued, is small.
IV BROADENING THE "METALLIC BASE'*
While the monetary stocks of gold in the United States
were sufficiently ample to secure the nation's money, the
argument was often advanced that the silver was needed to
"broaden the metallic base." The metallic base was evidently
the term applied to the final reserve-base, in terms of which
the currency is designated and valued. In this country, then,
that base island has been for some time, gold. Silver would
hardly have sufficed when its monetary value exceeded the
market price. No one would reason: "I have faith in this
dollar certificate because its silver reserve is worth thirty-
five cents on the world market." Probably the real, psycho-
logical base is custom and the credit of the United States.
Be that as it may, it is certainly not silver.
I
In fact, the issue of silver could do nothing else
but dilute the metallic base so long as the present system
is retained. For, the more silver dollars there are outstanding,
amounts of other dollars remaining constant, then the less gold
there is per dollar. Only by changing to a silver standard,
or a bimetallic, or the like, could the United States
strengthen its base by acquiring silver.
t
Ill
V PURCHASES FOR THE BENEFIT OF
THE SILVER-USING EAST
Arguments that high-priced silver would be a great
boon to the silver countries enjoyed currency during the past
decade. Yet, as has been observed, only China, Hong Kong,
Macao, and Tibet were on the silver standard in 1933 • The
other countries, Mexico and India, for example, were not on
silver, and they did not have a foreign exchange based on
silver. All these other countries, even if not on the gold
standard proper, valued their currencies in terms of gold.
A special case was made of India. The great Indian hoards
were pointed out as so much cruelly and radically reduced
purchasing power. Yet all authorities, conversant with the
Indian way of life, were convinced that these accumulations
were not apt to be sold at any price. They are treasures;
not temporarily deferred savings.
It is true, of course, that China was on the silver
standard. Despite the fact that they argued the silver program
would raise the price of world commodities, perhaps high silver
would aid the Chinese importers. Even here, however, the
silver enthusiasts were doomed to disappointment. For, just
as the experts told them, the ultimate payment for imports
comes from the sale of exports.
The facts of the case were that our exports to China
held up better than they did with the rest of the world.
(
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and Chineae Imports in general were reduced by a lesser amount
than were world imports. Chinese trade during this period ac-
tually increased in terms of total world trade. The statistical
evidence of this as well as per cent comparisons appears in
table XI of the Appendix.
This was true largely because of the low price of the
white metal. Low silver prevented the painful deflation ex-
perienced in most other countries. Chinese business continued
to be brisk and made for a greater demand for foreign goods.
At the same time low silver enhanced the Chinese export market
which resulted in a ready means for paying for imports
.
Consequently, it is easy to understand why our exports to
China decreased sharply after the silver purchases forced the
price of silver up by more than 100 per cant.
i
VI THE EFFECT OF THE SILVER PROGRAM
ON THE FUTURE OF SILVER
Strangely enough, the long rdn effect of the United
'states silver program will probably be advers to the white
metal. During the World War period, high silver prices in-
vited demonetization and debasement of silver coinage. Con-
versely, the olw prices after 1926 encouraged many countries
to coin their silver moneys once again. The coins were con-
venient and they probably retained much of their popular appeal.
The high prices caused by the United States silver policy,
however, caused a sharp reversal in the new trend back to
silver.
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Mexico and China furnish excellent examples. Mexico,
the world's foremost silver producer, debased her coi nage and
largely replaced it v/ith paper. China, long the last important
stronghold of the silver standard, was driven to adopt managed
currency. In 1929, her silver in monetary stocks was estimated
at I .35 per capita. In 1939 it was negligible while paper
had risen from #.58 to $5*82 per capita. The total monetary
silver decreased per capita for the world during this period,
despite an increase of over 300 per cent in the United States
per capita figures.
It may well be that this time the substitution of more
economical money for silver will be permanent. After careful
consideration, Professor Murad states that this will probably
be true for China. If other countries are able to weather our
current stcrms with somewhere nearly intact monetary systems,
the crusaders for the silver cause will probably find that they
have wrought irreparable damage to the future of silver.

ABSTRACT
Since 1933 the Federal G-overnment has purchased over
two and one third billion fine ounces of silver. This purchase
program came about as the result of silver agitation, born
of the depression of 1929. The agitation issued in the main
from two sources: congressmen from the silver states whose
constituents were interested in silver mining, and from the
inflationists who saw silver as a means to cheap money. As
the magnitude of the silver purchases would indicate, a large
measure of success was achieved in spite of the opposition of
Federal experts and private economists.
The attainments of the movement were due in no small
part to the identification of the demonetization of silver
with the primary causes of the depression. The idea that the
commodity's remonetization would effect recovery, where not
complet^^y the product of wishful thinking, enjoyed some
currency as a result of the failure to enquire into the causes
of silver's demonetization.
Briefly, gold came to supplant the white metal through
a series of chance ocaurrences . Silver was universal money in
the civilized world prior to the sixteenth century when the
gold supply of the Western Hemisphere became available. Then,
for about two centuries, gold became an additional monetary
metal in many countries, with the same free coinage and
(*
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legal tender powers enjoyed by silver. People saw no inherent
contradiction in having two independently variable standards of
value at one and the same time. Recurring monetary difficulties,
however, forced changes in bimetallism which eventually elimin-
ated the dual system.
In England, quite by chance, gold was retained as the
standard. Later, when England dominated the increasingly
important world trade, other countries, following the G-erman
example, also adopted some form of the gold standard. The
gold movement continued and in 1930 only four countries in the
world had a silver standard. Silver by this time, due to
greater production and decreasing monetary use, had depreciated
in value until its commercial ratio to gold was over 30 to 1
in the first part of the tv/entieth century.
This depreciation of the white metal served as the main-
spring of the demands for remonetization. Producers knew that
prior to 1873 silver was worth $1.2929 when delivered to a
government mint. Their lobbying for silver, no matter what
the particular argument employed, needs no explanation.
Debtors and people generally who felt that cheap money would
enhance their personal position in the economy were eager for
almost any type of money, so long as it was abundant. They
were easily lined up with the silverites.
This situation prevailed in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century. Out of its pressure came the Bland-Allison
and Sherman A cts, under which the government purchased nearly
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460 million fine ounces of silver at market prices. The
endless chain crisis brought the repeal of the program, while
the sound-money victory of I896, followed by prosperity,
ended the agitation.
Although a silver subsidy was railroaded through Congress
in 1918 under the guise of a war measure, no real silver move-
ment was again formed until the present one. Out of this
one has come a subsidy which makes that of the past century
seem insignificantly small. First came the permissive clauses
of the Thomas Amendment, passed in May of 1933. Under this
the President might have purchased silver in any volume at
any price he desired to establish. Actually, no silver was
purchased under the Act until after the World Monetary and
Economic Conference of June-July of that year.
At this world conference, the Eight-Nation Silver Pact
was enacted. Under its provisions, China, India, and Spain
agreed not to sell demonetized silver beyond certain araotints
,
while the United States, Australia, Canada, Mexico, and Peru,
as principal producers, undertook to purchase among them
thirty-five million ounces each year during the life of the
Pact. The Pact was effected for an initial period of four
years. When it expired at the close of 1937, no steps were
taken to renew it. As an examination of its terms discloses,
no country, save the United States, undertook unusual action
or refrained from customary procedure.
This agreement made it easy and quite necessary for the

government to purchase domestic silver. The President Insti-
tuted such a purchase program in his proclamation of December
twenty-first, 1933, which rested upon the Thomas Amendment.
Renewed from time to time, it resulted in the purchase of all
our currently produced domestic silver at prices far above
the market.
Not al all satisfied with this subsidy, the silver
enthusiasts secured new legislation. First came the ineffect-
ive Pittman Amendment to the Gold Reserve Act of 1934. This
was folloT/ed, because of the intense pressure of such legis-
lators as Dies, Thomas, and Wheeler, by the Administration's
compromise measure, the Silver Purchase Act of June, 1934.
Under it, some two billion fine ounces of foreign silver have
been bought by the Federal Government.
When the President's stabilization fund and his powers
to revalue the dollar and to issue three billion dollars
worth of greenbacks csme to a close in June, 1939, the basis
for his special domestic silver purchases also terminated.
The Administration was particularly anxious to preserve the
devaluation power, and the silver interests saw this as a
means to a new and greater subsidy. From April, 1935 to
January, 1938, the government had purchased silver at 77.57
cents an ouce. This figure now became th goal of the silver-
Ites. They allied themselves with the "hard-money" men. This
coalition secured the passage in the Senate of a measure to
revoke the devaluation power and to establish a mandatory
<9
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price of 77 •57 cents a fine ounce for current domestic silver.
Later, through a compromise with the silver "bloc, the Adminis-
tration regained the emergency powers in return for the manda-
tory price of 71 cents an ounce for domestic silver.
Numerous attempts by such legislators as Bacon, Barton,
and Townsend have failed to halt even the foreign purchases.
Equally fruitless has "been the opposition of the Economists'
National Committee on Monetary Policy, the New York State
Chamber of Commerce, and Chairman Eccles and his Federal
Reserve Board. The policy is apt to come to the fore this
June when once again the special silver provisions expire.
Under the various provisions the government has ac-
quired a tremendous hoard, largely from foreign sources, at
artificially high prices. Yet it has not secured an amount
sufficient to make the silver comprise 25 per cent of the
monetary stocks, the goal expressed in the Silver Purchase Act.
Nor were the claims of the silver enthusiasts fulfilled.
Silver purchases failed to increase the supply of money in
circulation, appreciably increase purchasing power, or raise
the price lel^el. One result, of course anticipated by the
silver interests, was the handsome subsidy.
The appreciation of the metal under the policy and its
attraction to the United States, caused severe and widespread
repercussions everywhere that silver was at all prominent.
To China, the hardest-hit nation, it brought deflation,
depression, and finally, managed currency. Mexico and many
c
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other countries, when they found themselves suffering from an
acute small-change shortage, either eliminated silver entirely
from their coinage or greatly debased it.
This will probably mean a permanently curtailed monetary
demand for the metal. Also the vast hoard acquired in the
course of the program will in all likelihood eventually be
added to the commercial supply of the metal. Consequently,
it is quite possible that the silver policy, which has brought
about so much unnecessary expense and hardship, will have
benefited no one in the long run.
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O-unces
Ail six
ciphers
2400
2000
1500
200
100
^•urrent domestic
silver
Nfitionalized
silver
^.-^oreif^n silver
18.78 -SO 1890-93 1920-23
So-urce: Tables I and III.
1934-40
IT. 3. SiLV3R PURGHASSS
C0
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Source: Director of Hint Reports-
Pig. 4— THU PRIKCHaL SILV3H STAT3S
^Approximate per cent distriliu
tion»
^'^"For calendar year 1938.
[
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TAEL3 I
SlLYm ACCiUIRjID "DITDER TE3 ACTS OP
18 73, 18 75. 18 78, 1890, aUD 1918
D^ate of
authorizing
act
Fine Ounces
purchased
Oost
average
price per
fine ounce
Bullion
value of
a silver
dollar
12. 18 73 5.434,282 ^ 7,15 2,564 |1.316 |1.018
Jan. 14, 18 75 31,603»906 37,5 71,148 1.189 .919
Feb. 28, 18 78 291^272,019 308,279,260 1.058 .819
Jul. 14, 1890 168,674,683 155,931,002 .924 .715
Apr. 23, 1918 200,000,000 200,000,000 1.000 *773
Source; Annual Report of the Director of the I!int . . .
1896, p. . ^nual Report Director of the'ITint . » 1925
.
p.
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TAEL^ II
SILVjIH dollar SPSaiFICATIOlJS
Standard
Atithori !!in ar ao t
weight
"Pi n p n
p
( thous.s)
April 2, 1792 416 grains 892.4
Jan, 18. 1837 412.5 900.0
Fe"b. 28, 18 78 (Bland -Alii son) 412.5 do.
J-uly 14, 1890 (Sherman) 412-5 do.
l^larch 3. 1891 412.5 do.
April 23. 1918 ( Pittman) 412»5 do.
Feb. 12. 18 73 (Trade dollar) 420.0 do
.
Ivlay 12. 1953 (Thomas Amendment)
J-une 19, 1934 (Silver Purchase Aot)
Can be
altered
do.
San be
altered
do.
Source: Annual Report of the Director of the I.Tint . » .
1934, p. 56. Annual Report of the Director of the I lint . . .
1938. pp.
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TaRLS III
SILVUn A0hT3IR3D JAimARY 1, 1934. TO JITJB 30, 1^40
EY CALSIOAH Y3aR3 aIO 3P1K;IFISD CLASSIFIGATIOIIS
(In millions of ovuaces or dollars)
ITewly Mined
^Year domestic Nationalized-' Foreis?!^ Total
Oimoes Dollars Ovmces Dollars Cmoes Dollars 0-unces Dollarj
1934 21.8 14.1 110.6 55.3 172.5 86.5 304.9 156.9
1935 38.0 27.3 2.0 1. 0 494.0 318.2 534.3 346.5
1936 61.1 47.3 .4 .2 271.9 150.3 333.4 197.9
1937 70.6 54.6 241.5 108.7 312.2 163.4
1938 61.6 42.2 355 .4 156.9 417.1 199.1
1939 60.7 39.9 282.8 120.5 343.3 160.4
19 40* 31.6 22.5 83.1 30.9 114.7 53.4
Total 345.4 247.9 113.0 56.5 1901.6 972.0 2359.9 1276.6
Av. price^
fine ovince 72J^ 50j^ 51J? 54JZ!
Per cent^
total oz. 14*6>o. 4.856s 80. 65^ 100. 0^{?
• • •
So urc e : Annual Report
1940, p. 133.
of the Secretary of the Treasury
1 Aoqiiired "by proclamation prior to J-une 30, 1939. AG -
q.\iired under Act of July, 1939 thereafter.
2 Acquired under proclamation of August 9, 1934, revoked
April 28, 1938.
3 AGq.uired under the Silver Purchase Act of 1934.
4 Not included in ori-^nal.
5 Not included in original.
* First six months only.
I f
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year
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
ooivipoirjnres op tiis silver lioit^tary stocic
31. 1934 TO 1939, MU) JLITS 30. 1940
( in millions of dollars)
Silver held in Treasiiry Z __lVilver outside'
Securing silver In (general Fund Treasury
certificates-^
_
|
"\ Total
Silver Silver
^
;^Eullior^ Silver Sutsidirl Silver
"bullion dollars i Coin'^ : for le-^at dollarsiary coin at ^1.29
211.6
576»9
775.9
938.8
1137.6
1298.2
1353.2
508.4 4.2
508.7 4*2
505.7 5.7
503.7 5.4
502.7 3.5
499.0 5.3
498.1 3.6
oDtna^e icost
8.8 89.3 35.2 305.3 1279.7
.2 362.'^ 38.4 323.5 1970.1
.3 347.7 41.3 350.4 2402.3
428.6 43.3 366.9 2606.5
.2 535.3 44.4 3 72.8 3346.8
616.0 48.1 394.1 3790.2
.8 643.3 49.0 398.6 3939.6
1940.
1 Valued at .^1.29 29 per ounce.
^ Valued at -51.28 plus per ounce.
Source; Aimual Report o f the S ec re tar;/ of ,the Treasury
p. 133.
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PISCJAL ^IJD IIOIJ^AHY *5T0CJICS
Gold Silver
(Thousands of dollars) (Thousands of ounces) Silvei* |s
Year Net additions Stock at Net Additions''" Stock at per ceni
end of year end of year of ^old
1933 ;,.399,958 4,317,554 6,036 27,75 7 .82?'o
1934 727,627^ 7.856,181^ 35,241 62.998 1.-
1935 1,259,462 9,115.643 283,060 346,058 4.9
1936 1,492.774 10,608,417 730.807 1,076.865 10.6
1937 1.709,854 12.318.271 206.624 1,283,489 13.4
1938 644,683 12,962,954 395,043 l,o78,632 16.6
1939 3.147.125 16,110,079 444.421 2,1^2.953 17.1
1940 3,853,012 19,963.091 242,216 2,365,169 15.2
Total 13,233,495 2,343.445 22.8
* Valued at monetary value of $1.29 29 per fine ounce.
This column not a pprt of original table.
1 Exclusive of newly acquired "bulliaLii oonteined in
manufactured coin.
^ Includes the increment of approximately $2,811,000,000
on the government's holdings.
Source: Annual Report of th e Secretery of the Treasury
. . . 1940, p.

130
TABL3 ri
SILVER rRODrCJTIClI. 1930-38
(In thOTisands of ounces
)
[fear jToriu. United
States
U.S. as
per c ent
of world
Ilexioo Canada Peru Aus-
tralia
L330 248, 708 50,627 20.4% 105.411 26,436 15,500 8,888
L931 195.920 30,8 22 15.7 86 ,065 20,558 10.942 7, 772
L932 164.893 23.832 14.5 69,303 18,356 6, 735 8.436
L933 169,159 22,821 13.5 68,101 15,187 6. 760 10,540
L934 190,398 32,48 7 17.1 74,145 16 , 415 10.581 10.516
L935 220, 704 45 , 613 20.3 75,589 16,619 17.433 11.585
L936 253,696 63,351 25.0 77,464 18.335 19,901 11,759
L537 274,538 71.299 25.8 84,681 22.683 16.994 14,291
L938 267,913. 611689 23.0 81,019 22,157 20,425 14.537
Source: Data taken from that appearing in annual reports oi
the Director of the Iiint for the year following the year in the
stove tatle.
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TAEL^ VII
SILV3R PRC:DUC?TICLi Ii< Sia.3CT3D STATSS*
Rounded Index IJurnbers
1928 etiuals 100
Year Calif. Col. Idaho L'ont. llev. U.LI. Utah
1928 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1929 119 82 101 106 118 89 115 104
1930 75 98 110 108 80 79 126 81
1931 62 53 54 83 38 45 116 45
1932 33 35 38 74 22 24 120 43
1933 33 25 49 74 33 19 126 30
1934 64 55 80 84 34 54 108 43
1935 88 73 111 115 76 77 123 49
1936 130 139 146 166 108 92 135 63
193 145 191 143 218 110 80 15 2 71
1938 114 183 178 206 63 77 136 58
1939 113 177 18 7 193 84 85 136 62
* These ei^t^t states in 1928 accounted for 85 per cent
of the total United States output; in 1938, 93 per cent of the
total. For per cents and rank order, see Fi/jure 4.
Source: CJalcuLations from data taken from annual reports
of the Director of the Lint for years immediately foll3)wing
each year presented here.
*4
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TiiBLS VIII
CAlITiiL CrOlITROL OF i:ilI3 AlJD RHTFIIjBRY
IRODUCTIOII OF SILV3R III 19 29
Producing
coimtrie s
grouped to
show nationality
of oapital control
Controlled "by
tf-S.A'. capital;
United States
ilexico
Canada
Peru
Central Amer-
ica
Chile
Others
Controlled by
British capital:
Canada
llexioo
Australasia
India and
Burma
Cape Colony and
Transvaal
0 th er s
Controlled "by
Germen capital:
Germeny
Mine production
In AS per As per
millions cent of cent of
Refinery producti( n
AS per
c ent of
AS per
cent of
of domestic world domestic world
unc es output output output output
172.7 100.0 62.2 205.9 72.8
ol» 2 lUU . u or? /I23.4 lUU, u 52.1
81.0 74.5 37.6 95.6 20.7
rr rr O33 .o 3. U
18.8 87.4 7.2
2»o l.u
1.1 82.5 .4
.3 .1
55.8 21.7 11.4
15.3 66.0 5.7 100.0 5.1
21.5 19.8 8.2
10.4 100.0 4.0 100.0 3.3
7.3 100.0 2.8 100 .0 2.6
1.0 100. J .4 100.0 .4
1.3 .5
5.1 1.9 10.0
5.1 100.0 1.9 100.0 10.0
Source: Leong, Silver (V/ashington: The Brookings Insti-
tute, 1933), p 70. Here source is given as; W.P. Rawles, The
Uetionrlity of Commercial Control of World Minerals, 1933,
pp. 31-34.
1.
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Country
C z ec ho slo vaki a
Finland
Great Britain
Italy
Lithuania
Rumania
Total
TAPL3 IX
WAR OKET PAY1I52TTS III SILV3R
Fine ounces Value at 50^/ounce
359.010.49
296,631.88
20,001.086.84
2.000,041.52
19.980.70
58.122-92
22.734,8 24.35
$ 179,505.25
148.315.94
10.000,518.42
1.000,020.76
9,990.35
29.061.46
11.367.412.18
Source: Annual Report of the Secretary o f the Treasury
• • • 1213. 27.
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ISTniATSD SALSrS OP D5II,:0II3TI2]iID SILYl^R, 19S0-32
ACrCORDDJa TO aOTJlJTRY OF ORIGIN
Other j?uropean French
LTnitei Ihiropean British Indo- Other Total, all
Year KingGLoin Sellers India China Countries Countri
1920 27.0 27.0
1921 -6 •b 30.0^ 36.5
1922 24»0 19 .0 43.0
19 23 25 .0 20.0 45 .0
1924 2.0 18.0 20.0
7 D
.u
1926 .7 7.0^ '''7. 7
1927 1.2 8.0 - 9.2 18.4
1928 5.5 32.0^ 22.5 60.0
19 29 10.0 10.0^ 35.0 12.0 67.0
1930 3 22.0^*^ 29.5 20.0 71.5
1931
3
^- 35,0 6.4 27.4^ 68.5
1932 11 . o 24.0 10,0 1.0° 46.6
Total 81.9 227.6 156.2 48.4 28.4 541.2
Footnotes appear on foilov7ing page
Source; H. I.I. Bratter, The I.Ionetary Uae of Silver in
1933 ('Yashington, D.G.: Bureau of Foreign ani Domestic
Commerce, 1934), p. 6.
It
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TAPLS X, Contin-aed
Footnotes;
1 Germany accounted for 8,000,000 of this total.
^ Of the 79,000,000 ounces reported as sold "by ^-urope
from 1926-1930, inclusive, 66,000,000 ounces came from Prance
end 13,000,000 ounces came from Pel/^ium.
^ In 1930 and 1931 additional supplies came to London fro||n
Surope and from the delDasement of British coina^^e. These were
all used in the manufacture of coin from other counties and are
not shown in this table.
^ This includes 20,000,000 ounces from Siam, 4,200,000
ounces from Mexico, and 2,900,000 ounces from -Sc'^pt.
^ This came entirely from the Union of Soviet Socialist
Re publics*
^ This amount cams from the Hear 3ast.
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TAELB XI
0KI1T3SI3 THAD3 AITD THB PRIC3 OP SILV:3R
Year
Index of sil-
ver prices*
Chinese imports
as per cent of
world imports
Index of
Chinese im-
ports from 1
Index of
total V»
[J.S^ exports*
19 25 113.3 2.5 91.8 99.0
1926 102.0 2.7 109.0 97.0
1927 92.9 2.1 88.2 99.0
1928 95.5 2.5 111.0 103.0
1929 87.0 2.3 133.7 105.2
1930 63.0 2.1 81.4 78.5
1931 47.5 2.4 88 .6 50.4
1932 46.2 2.6 70.0 33.8
1933 57.0 2.3 52.9 35.0
1934 78.5 1.8 42.3 44.5
1935 105.0 1.6 49.2 48 .0
1936 73.7 1.3 42.4 52.0
1937 73.5 1.0 42.2 70.0
* Average of years 1925-28 equals 100.
So-urce: Trade statistics ^thered from Commerce Yearbool^jls
serve as TDases for col"umns 2, 3, and 4. Silver price index is
oalciilated from fi^iores appearing in annual reports of the
Director of the Mint.
I
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TABL3 ZII
DISTRIBUTION OF TH3 V/CRL"J^ SILVER
(In millions of o-unaes)
Jan. T 1 fT1, 1933 Net
six
c he n^e
years
Jan. 1,
A. Monetary
United States 640 1.935 2,5 75
C?hina 1.700 1.120 580
India 1.050 110 940
Other ooimtries 1.550 40 1.510
Total monetary 4.940 665 5,605
B. Non-monetary
United States 1.000 160 1.160
China 800 800
Indie 3.300 210 3 .510
Other countries
Total non-monetary
1.500
^000
15 0
5 20
1 ,650
7^120
0. Permanently lost, or de-
stroyed, or unaccounted 3.946 175 4,121
Grand total production since
1493 15.486 1, 360 16,846
Source; D.H. Leavens, Silver Koney { Bloomington, Indiana:
Principia Press, Inc., 193€). p.
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